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The First Amendment Implications of  
Copyright’s Double Standard 
 




Copyright law has First Amendment problems. On its face, copyright is 
consistent with freedom of expression. However, its interpretation is subject to a 
content-based bias against “entertainment” that renders its application 
constitutionally problematic and, arguably, unconstitutional. The scope of 
copyright liability, and the extent to which it both chills and punishes copying for 
the purpose of expressing one’s “taste and opinion,” imposes a double standard 
that denies authors of these works the freedom to incorporate the work of others. 
In contrast, all other authors may borrow freely from other works so long as they 
do not tell the same story or retell that story in another medium, which this Article 
describes as “virtual appropriation.” This double standard is created through a 
series of inconsistent, contradictory, and hypocritical interpretations of copyright 
and, in the end, is based upon a judicial elitism that dismisses the value of works 
of entertainment and the creative choices of those authors. 
The copyright infringement action brought against Robin Thicke and 
Pharrell Williams is illustrative. Marvin Gaye’s family argued that Thicke’s and 
Williams’s smash hit, “Blurred Lines,” infringed Marvin Gaye’s copyrighted 
music and lyrics to “Got to Give it Up.”2 During the litigation, Thicke testified that 
he wanted Williams to write a song that had the same groove as Gaye’s song.3 In 
writing the song, Williams testified that the only thing the songs had in common 
was their feel.4 When one listens to both songs, there is a clear similarity of feel 
between the recordings.5 And, the litigation arose because Williams clearly 
captured the groove.6 But should an artist be punished for capturing the groove of 
another artist? How does one even define the groove or determine what constitutes 
the groove? Does it matter that the specific question was not whether the 
recordings had a similar feel, but whether Williams reproduced protected elements 
of Gaye’s sheet music to achieve that feel? Even though the sheet music did not 
                                                        
1 Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Director, Center for Cyberspace 
Law & Policy. I would like to thank Adam Candeub and the faculty and students of Michigan State 
University School of Law for their feedback on an earlier draft of this essay. I would also like to thank 
Mark Lemley, Aaron Perzanowski, Cassandra Robertson, Rebecca Tushnet, and the students of my Fall 
2017 Copyright Law class for their insightful comments and criticisms.  I would also like to thank the 
editors of the Virginia Sports and Entertainment Law Journal, especially Jacqueline Malzone for the 
thoughtful time and effort they put in to publish this article. 
2 Kory Grow, Robin Thicke, Pharrell Lose Multi-Million Dollar ‘Blurred Lines’ Lawsuit, Rolling 
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contain many elements of Gaye’s sound recording, the jury was allowed to 
determine whether Thicke and Williams, nonetheless, copied “too much” from 
Gaye.7 Ultimately, the jury sided with the Gaye family and awarded over seven 
million dollars in damages, one of the largest verdicts in copyright history.8  
Decisions like “Blurred Lines” result from an interpretation of copyright 
law that punishes new authors for copying even the most intangible aspects of a 
prior work, even if they are unaware that they are copying.9 This is not the 
traditional or “easy” case of copyright infringement where defendants simply 
duplicate/pirate the copyright owner’s work. Instead, authors may be punished for 
using even the ideas from another work if courts conclude that their purpose is to 
entertain. As this article demonstrates, this subjective evaluation of the merits of 
expression is reserved exclusively for so-called works of “entertainment.”10 Under 
similar circumstances, a historian or painter would not have faced a jury because 
they would have been protected by the idea/expression distinction, the doctrine of 
fair use, or both.  
As applied to entertainment, copyright is both impermissibly content-
based and unconstitutionally vague. In other words, copyright law imposes 
substantial liability on expression based upon the content of speech and does so 
based upon rules that do not delineate clear borders between prohibited and 
permissible expression (i.e., when a speaker may “copy” another).11 Instead, 
copyright law’s blurred lines force future authors of works that might be 
categorized as entertainment into revising their intended expression, foregoing it 
altogether, or running the risk of defending against allegations of infringement and 
the imposition of substantial monetary damages. While the lines may be blurred, 
the message is clear: copy at your own risk. 
Copyright’s constitutional problems are the products of an inconsistent, 
contradictory and hypocritical bias against entertainment. This bias is exemplified 
by a statement made by a former register of copyright. In rejecting the proposition 
that file-sharing services -- at the time, Napster -- promoted creativity and human 
understanding by facilitating access to music and other creative works, the register 
began his defense of copyright liability with the rhetorical question, “What’s the 
big deal? It’s just entertainment.”12 In other words, denying individuals access to 
the music of their choice is not a significant harm because the music, while 
valuable financially, has little substantive value. Put another way, there is little, if 
any, harm when members of the public cannot listen to Bruno Mars either because 
they cannot afford or are unwilling to agree to the copyright owner’s demands. 
Meanwhile, allowing people to access the song for free denies the copyright owner 
control of, and, potentially, compensation for the song. The situation is considered 
different if the public were denied access to educational content or to content that 
might inspire future thinkers, but not to a pop song. As discussed below, Justice 
Blackmun made this very argument in Sony v. Universal City Studios, the 
landmark decision in which the Supreme Court concluded that the personal 
                                                        
7 Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150, 1167—70 (9th Cir. 2018). 
8 Grow, supra note 2. 
9 Three Boys Music v. Michael Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 486 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Michael 
Bolton subconsciously copied the Isley Brothers’ “Love is a Wonderful Thing”); Bright Tunes Music v. 
Harrisongs Music, 420 F. Supp. 177, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (concluding that George Harrison 
subconsciously copied Ronald Mack’s “He’s So Fine”). 
10 See infra Part III.  
11 See infra Part V. 
12 Ralph Oman, Former Register of Copyrights (1985-93), Copyright: Beyond the Rhetoric, Panel at 
Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal Symposium: The Digital Challenge to 
Copyright Law (Feb. 2004). 
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copying made possible by the VCR was a fair use.13 Despite losing in that decision, 
Justice Blackmun’s position has largely won the day.14 
The bias against entertainment is not limited to the right of audiences to 
receive speech. It applies equally to speakers as well. The position that “it’s just 
entertainment” justifies restricting the freedom of authors creating new works that 
are considered works of entertainment. Once again, we are told that denying an 
author the freedom to create expression as they see fit, for the purposes they see 
fit, is not a big deal. If it is not a big deal to deny a listener access to Bruno Mars, 
it is also not a big deal to deny writers and performers of popular music the ability 
to “copy” Bruno Mars. Recognizing this judicial and doctrinal bias against 
entertainment lends clarity to some of the most difficult and opaque areas of 
copyright law, and reveals an inconsistent, hypocritical, and arguably 
unconstitutional regulation of speech.  
Moreover, as the bias against entertainment is found both implicitly and 
explicitly in the very copyright doctrines that are supposed to safeguard freedom 
of expression -- the idea/expression distinction and the doctrine of fair use -- it 
raises serious First Amendment questions. Why are restrictions upon 
entertainment not a big deal? How does speech that entertains differ from other 
speech? How can courts determine when speech is “just entertainment” without 
injecting their own subjective biases? What must authors do in terms of their own 
creativity to overcome this bias? Put another way, is it consistent with the First 
Amendment to allow judges and juries to punish speech they consider unworthy 
because of a purpose to entertain? This Article argues no, and that the New York 
Times v. Sullivan15 line of cases dealing with defamation should guide First 
Amendment analysis of copyright. Because of the inherent difficulty in punishing 
speech based upon a subjective evaluation of its purpose and creativity, courts 
must guarantee sufficient breathing space for individuals to express themselves 
when they choose to do so by incorporating the works of others. 
Part II introduces the “What’s the big deal? It’s just entertainment,” 
argument, and how the Supreme Court responded in two landmark decisions: Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.16 and Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing 
Co.17 Part II.A. demonstrates that the common understanding of these cases 
overlooks the importance of their relationship to entertainment, and their clear 
rejection of subjecting works of entertainment to a different standard under 
copyright law. In Sony, this requires a careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
justification for concluding that fair use encompasses home video recording of 
television programming even if that use is not productive.  
Part II.B. then argues that the full import of Justice Holmes’ famous 
opinion in Bleistein, adopting what has become copyright’s bedrock principle of 
non-discrimination, can only be understood when his opinion is recognized as part 
of a much larger debate on the scope of Congress’ powers to recognize copyright 
in order to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts.”18 Part II.B. argues 
                                                        
13 464 U.S, 417 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
14 See infra Part III.  
15 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
16 Id. (majority opinion). 
17 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
18 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For a similar approach to Bleistein but in relation to the definition of 
progress under the Copyright Clause see Barton Beebe, Bleistein, The Problem of Aesthetic Progress, 
and the Making of American Copyright Law, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 319, 351 (2017). I am deeply indebted 
to Beebe’s work as it led me to reconsider the decision with respect to the relationship between the 
Copyright Clause and entertainment. But see Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking 
Constitutional Indifference to Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 10-18 (2013) 
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that the Supreme Court’s decision was a direct response to and rejection of the 
argument that neither works of “fine art” nor entertainment -- but especially not 
works of entertainment -- were sufficiently valuable to fall under Congress’ power 
to grant exclusive rights under the Copyright Clause. The Constitutional 
importance of this conclusion cannot be overstated, as it represents a fundamental 
rejection of the argument that the Copyright Clause justifies content-based 
discrimination. 
Part III demonstrates that despite the approaches taken by the Supreme 
Court in Sony and Bleistein, courts have interpreted the otherwise neutral 
idea/expression distinction and doctrine of fair use to discriminate against works 
of entertainment. Part III.A. demonstrates that courts have recognized two separate 
categories of ideas: those that “advance the understanding of phenomena or the 
solution of problems” and those that are infused only with “the author’s taste or 
opinion.”19 In Part III.B., this Article demonstrates that the promise that fair use 
will protect the freedom of future authors to create works of their own when they 
use other works as raw material for their own creative expression is illusory when 
it comes to entertainment.   
In Part IV, this Article critically examines the principal justification for 
a double standard: that factual works (works that seek to explain phenomena or to 
provide solutions to problems) are fundamentally different from entertainment, 
which critics historically described as frivolous works (those representing the 
author’s taste and opinion). Part IV.A. explores whether there are inherent 
differences justifying a greater tolerance or need for copying in science than in 
entertainment and contends that the “facts are different” argument mistakenly 
conflates conclusions with expression. Because works of science answer problems 
or propose solutions, it is perhaps inevitable and even desirable that multiple 
authors reach the same conclusion. However, recognizing that authors should be 
free to and may inevitably reach the same conclusion does not mean that they must 
repeat the original author’s expression or get there without having to contribute 
something of their own. Part IV.B. considers the various instrumental justifications 
for a double standard, and argues that those reasons apply equally to entertainment. 
Moreover, to the extent that more limited copyright protection is justified based 
upon the likelihood that future expression will be chilled, Part IV.C. argues that 
this argument weighs in favor of works of entertainment because the creative 
expression of those authors is more likely to be chilled by copyright liability.  
Finally, Part V considers the First Amendment implications of 
recognizing copyright discrimination against entertainment, and argues that there 
are no objective reasons for imposing greater restrictions upon creators of so-
called works of “taste and opinion.” It begins by explaining the Supreme Court’s 
current understanding of the relationship between copyright and freedom of 
speech, and its reliance upon the idea/expression distinction and fair use. Part V.A. 
explains why these doctrines cannot be relied upon to safeguard First Amendment 
interests. Both doctrines allow judges to engage in a form of copyright Lochnerism 
in which their personal opinions on the value of entertainment not only define the 
scope of copyright, but alter the boundaries of free speech as well. Part V.B. argues 
that copyright’s double standard represents a content-based regulation of speech. 
It is void-for-vagueness. As Bleistein recognized, attempting to separate the fine 
arts from entertainment is fundamentally fraught with difficulty. And, to the extent 
                                                        
(arguing that the courts have erroneously expanded reach of the Copyright Clause under the principle of 
non-discrimination).  
19 See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reps., Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 1994). 
SPRING 2018 FIRST AMENDMENT & COPYRIGHT VOL. 17:2 
167 
that the idea/expression distinction and fair use doctrine are used to justify a double 
standard, they themselves are unconstitutionally vague.  
Part V.C. highlights the First Amendment problems raised by a content-
neutral expansion of copyright protection. In other words, is it constitutional to 
eliminate copyright’s double standard by imposing the same heightened standard 
of liability (currently limited to entertainment) to all works? Part V.C. argues that 
the expanding copyright under those circumstances cannot satisfy intermediate 
scrutiny let alone strict scrutiny. Neither a desire for a greater variety of expression 
nor increasing the gatekeeping powers of existing copyright owners, therefore 
increasing their relative power in the marketplace of ideas, are legitimate 
government interests. Not only are these interests illegitimate, they are clearly 
related to the suppression of expression. Lastly, Part V.D. explains why expanding 
copyright protection beyond virtual appropriation raises problems with regard to 
the constitutional fit between ends and means. In other words, exclusive rights 
arguably suppress more speech than necessary to protect the legitimate interests 
of authors. In both Parts V.C. and V.D., this Article argues that the New York Times 
v. Sullivan line of cases dealing with defamation should guide this First 
Amendment analysis.  
 
II. WHO CARES ABOUT HONEY BOO BOO? THE SUPREME COURT. 
 
Modern copyright law traces its origins to the English Statute of Anne, 
which expressly recognized that the purpose of copyright was to encourage 
learning,20 and to the U.S. Constitution, which empowers Congress “to promote 
the progress of science and the useful arts by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”21 
In light of these stated purposes, the statement, “What’s the big deal? It’s just 
entertainment,” seems perfectly reasonable. If the purpose of copyright is to 
encourage learning and promote progress, one might expect courts to distinguish 
works that are consistent with the Copyright Clause from those that are not. Doing 
so would require courts to define “science” and “the useful arts,” and to determine 
when a work fits within either of those definitions. While physics is a science, is 
philosophy? Medical journals advance science, but do sculptures? Do cartoons? 
Nevertheless, it is almost universally accepted that copyright law should not 
discriminate based upon the subject matter let alone the content of a work. 
Currently, copyright protects all creative works, scientific publications and 
broadcasts of NBA basketball, works of fiction as well as pornography, statues, 
and stuffed animals.22 With respect to stuffed animals and similar works, Justice 
Douglas once noted that copyright protects,  
 
[S]tatuettes, book ends, clocks, lamps, door knockers, 
candlesticks, inkstands, . . . and ash trays. Perhaps these are 
‘writings’ in the constitutional sense. But to me, at least, they 
are not obviously so. It is time we came to the problem full 
                                                        
20 Copyright Act of 1709, 8 Ann. c. 21. 
21 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
22 See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that 
broadcasts of the NBA and other sporting events are subject to copyright protection); Ty, Inc. v. GMA 
Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing copyright protection for Beanie 
Babies); Mitchell Brothers Films Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(“Congress has not chosen to refuse copyrights on obscene materials …”). 




While Justice Douglas was referring to the Copyright Clause’s definition of 
writings, one may be tempted to argue that the Clause’s reference to science and 
the useful arts is also a lingering question; you would be wrong. As this Part 
demonstrates, the Supreme Court has responded to the question, “What’s the big 
deal? It’s just entertainment?” with a question of its own: “Who are we to judge?” 
Part II.A. introduces this problem and demonstrates that it was a critical issue in 
Sony. The decision illustrates both the persistence of these doubts, as represented 
by Justice Blackmun’s dissent, and how Justice Stevens’ majority opinion may not 
have been as clear as one might expect. Part II.B. argues that while this uncertainty 
may be traced back to Justice Holmes’ conclusory and almost dismissive opinion 
in Bleistein, when that opinion is recognized as the final word in a much a larger 
debate on the scope of the Copyright Clause, it becomes clear why the non-
discrimination principle has been and should continue to be a guiding principle of 
copyright law. 
 
A. Sony v. Universal City Studios: Audiences 
 
“What’s the big deal? It’s just entertainment,” is more than the opinion 
of one individual. It is a significant, if sometimes unstated, perspective in 
copyright law. Consider the Supreme Court’s landmark decision, Sony v. 
Universal City Studios, in which a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that 
unauthorized home recording of television programming was fair use.24 Sony 
recognized the freedom of individuals to make copies for personal use even when 
copyright owners object. In Sony, the specific personal use was recording a 
television program to watch at a different time.25 This personal use led to the 
growth of video recording from the VCR to the DVR. With respect to music, 
personal uses include the creation of mixtapes for a Walkman or playlists for an 
iPhone, ripping music from compact discs to one’s computer and uploading music 
to a digital music player. Individuals are also free to make personal copies of texts 
and images by hand, photocopier, scanner, or camera as part of personal use.26 On 
its face, Sony clearly holds that the recording of entertainment is as much a fair 
use as the recording of news or education programming. In other words, it is a big 
deal to the viewing public.27 Nonetheless, given the reach of the decision, one 
might find it surprising that the Court did not explicitly address whether the 
recording of educational programming or news should be treated differently than 
the recording of a sitcom or reality television. As the following demonstrates, this 
issue did arise, but only obliquely. 
When the Supreme Court concluded that copyright law did not prohibit 
the home recording of television programming, it did so without distinguishing 
between the types of programs being recorded.28 As such, it is equally fair to record 
an episode of PBS’s Frontline or Mr. Roger’s Neighborhood as it would be to 
record an episode of Seinfeld or Here Comes Honey Boo Boo. The Supreme Court, 
however, was sharply divided 5-4 in the decision. Writing for the dissent, Justice 
                                                        
23 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 221 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring).  
24 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442-56 (1984). 
25 Id. at 455. 
26 See generally, Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 785 Tex. L. Rev. 1871 (2006-2007) (analyzing 
both the history of personal uses as fair uses and arguing for expanded recognition). 
27 Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-56.  
28 Id. at 443-46. 
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Blackmun disputed that fair use should include watching television programming 
like Honey Boo Boo. After all, a significant portion of television programming at 
issue was “just entertainment.”29 
Here Comes Honey Boo Boo was a popular television program that 
follows Alana “Honey Boo Boo” Thompson and her family.30 Honey Boo Boo 
originally gained popularity as a child beauty pageant participant documented in 
the program Toddlers and Tiaras.31 For the purposes of this discussion, whether 
the copyrighted work is a television program like Here Comes Honey Boo Boo, 
Dancing with the Stars, or Breaking Bad, a novel such as Harry Potter and the 
Half-Blood Prince or Fifty Shades of Grey, a popular song like “Blurred Lines” or 
“All About the Bass,” or a video game like Rayman Raving Rabbids or Cuphead, 
is irrelevant. Instead, this Article uses Honey Boo Boo as a proxy for any and all 
works that may be considered “just entertainment” or, even more harshly, as 
nothing more than a distraction, a circus, or an opiate for the masses. 
The majority in Sony concluded that the unauthorized personal recording 
of broadcast television programs was a fair use because it expanded the audience 
for programming.32 Home recording allowed members of the public to watch 
television programs that they would otherwise not have been able to watch.33 In 
reaching this conclusion the majority also relied upon the fact that the copyright 
owners could not demonstrate that such copying was “harmful, or that if it should 
become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the 
copyrighted work.”34 The district court found no evidence that home recording 
would harm the size of live audiences or the ratings and revenues derived from 
viewership.35 Likewise, the Court found no evidence that home recording would 
hurt theatrical releases, reruns, or rentals.36 In the absence of evidence indicating 
that home recording would harm these revenue sources, increasing access to 
television outweighed the copyright owners’ desire to control the conditions of 
that access.37 
In contrast, Justice Blackmun argued for the dissent that home recording was not 
a fair use because watching television was not a “productive use,”38 or as discussed 
later, a transformative use.39 Simply watching television was not a valuable use of 
a copyrighted work, and as such, restricting the number of individuals who might 
watch a television program was not a loss to society. Justice Blackmun compared 
the relative harms to society of denying an “ordinary user” access to a television 
show to the harms of denying a scholar access to research materials. According to 
Blackmun, when the ordinary user of a copyrighted work is denied access, “only 
the individual is the loser.”40 In contrast, “when the scholar forgoes the use of a 
prior work, not only does his own work suffer, but the public is deprived of his 
contribution to knowledge.”41 According to Blackmun, the doctrine of fair use 
                                                        
29 Id. at 477-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
30 Here Comes Honey Boo Boo, Wikipedia 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_Comes_Honey_Boo_Boo (last visited May 28, 2018). 
31 Id. 
32 Sony, 464 U.S. at 421 & 454.  
33 Id. at 421. 
34 Id. at 451. 
35 Id. at 452-53. 
36 Id. at 453. 
37 Id. at 454. 
38 Id. at 478-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
39 See infra Part III.B. 
40 Sony, 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
41 Id. at 477-78. 
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should only protect uses equivalent to the scholar’s copying, and he notes that the 
examples provided by the Copyright Act and by the legislative history are all 
examples of “productive” or “socially laudable” uses.42 According to the dissent, 
watching television is not a “socially laudable” use.43 There is no loss to society if 
an audience member cannot watch the trials and tribulations of Honey Boo Boo; 
and even if some loss exists, it is easily outweighed by the interests of copyright 
owners in setting the conditions for audiences to access copyrighted programming.  
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion responds to the dissenters in a footnote. 
According to Justice Stevens, while the distinction between productive and 
unproductive uses may be helpful, it is not dispositive.44 “Although copying to 
promote a scholarly endeavor certainly has a stronger claim to fair use than 
copying to avoid interrupting a poker game, the question is not simply two-
dimensional.”45 In attempting to identify the social good created by gaining access 
to Here Comes Honey Boo Boo, Justice Stevens essentially argues that it is difficult 
to determine when society benefits: 
 
A teacher who copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly 
productive. But so is a teacher who copies for the sake of 
broadening his understanding of his specialty. Or a legislator 
who copies for the sake of broadening her understanding of 
what her constituents are watching; or a constituent who copies 
a news program to help make a decision on how to vote.46 
 
In other words, courts should not categorically require a use to be “productive” 
because we can never say for certain that the unauthorized use will not lead to 
socially valuable ends.47 As such, in the absence of evidence that personal copying 
will seriously harm the ability of copyright owners to obtain compensation in other 
markets, expanding the audience for copyrighted works is a sufficiently valuable 
means to achieve ends that are themselves valuable to the public.48 
By arguing that that we can never determine ex-ante when a particular 
act of copying will lead to socially beneficial ends, and without differentiating 
between the subject matter of the recorded programming, Justice Stevens hints at 
an answer to the question, “Who cares about Honey Boo Boo?”. While the majority 
specifically rejects the dissenting argument that watching television can never be 
considered a fair use, implicit is also the idea that someone or everyone is harmed 
if denied the opportunity to watch Honey Boo Boo.49 In other words, entertainment 
can equally inform audience members about their profession, their constituents, 
their civic duty, as well as contribute to more traditional productive copyright uses 
such as the creation of new works. As such, being free to copy Honey Boo Boo is 
important because the show is an important part of the audience’s search for 
                                                        
42 Id. at 477-80. 
43 See id. 
44 Id. at 455 n.40. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Rebecca Tushnet expands upon this idea and makes a detailed argument that the basic act of copying 
itself should be protected by the First Amendment, and interpreting fair use to require a use be productive 
or transformative, is inconsistent with freedom of speech. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How 
Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004).  
48 Sony, 464 U.S. at 454 (“[T]o the extent that time-shifting expands public access, . . . it yields societal 
benefits.”); see also Beebe, supra note 18, at 390 (arguing access is an important element of aesthetic 
practice). 
49 Id. at 455 n.40.  
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meaning, identity, and understanding. It may form the foundation of life choices 
and public policy decisions. It may also provide an opportunity for reflection, or 
an opportunity to experience a part of or the full spectrum of human emotion. So 
even if it may not be a big deal to Justice Blackmun, it is a big deal to the audience 
that would otherwise be denied access. If unauthorized access to entertainment is 
important to the audience, it is equally important to the creators of that expression. 
Unfortunately, crucial elements of the foundational Supreme Court opinion on this 
subject are just as opaque as the opinions in Sony. 
 
B. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic: Authors 
 
Equal treatment under copyright originates with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic.50 In that decision, Justice Holmes 
first articulated copyright’s non-discrimination principle.51 As Barton Beebe’s 
recent article demonstrates, the issues presented in Bleistein are far more 
complicated and nuanced than generally understood.52 As this section explains, the 
implications and meaning of Justice Holmes’ opinion and how it might apply with 
respect to the “just entertainment” argument can only be understood when his 
opinion is read as part of a larger dialogue. For Beebe, this is an overarching 
dialogue on the nature and definition of progress in copyright law, and how 
Bleistein has been misunderstood and misapplied as the foundation for a definition 
of progress focused upon material progress.53 He argues persuasively that Bleistein 
is best understood as advocating for aesthetic progress.54 The goal of this section 
is more modest. It focuses more narrowly on Justice Holmes’ opinion as the final 
word in the dialogue among the Supreme Court justices and the lower court judges 
in Bleistein, and, in that context, what it has to say about the value of 
entertainment.  
The plaintiffs in Bleistein created three engravings: one depicted ballet 
dancers, another depicted trick bicycle riding, and a third depicted performers 
made to look like statutes.55 These engravings were used to print pamphlets 
advertising the acts as part of a circus.56 When Bleistein and the other plaintiffs 
sued for the unauthorized reproduction of these images, Donaldson Lithographic 
Co. argued that the engravings were not protected by copyright and were 
uncopyrightable.57 According to the district court, because Congress had limited 
copyright protection for pictorial illustration to the “fine arts,”58 “the prime 
question is whether the things copyrighted here are pictorial illustrations 
connected with the fine arts, or are such as are intended to be perfected as works 
of the fine arts.”59 In finding for the defendant, the district court concluded that the 
engravings were neither pictorial illustrations nor fine art.60 With respect to the 
                                                        
50 188 U.S. 239 (1903).  
51 Id. at 249-50.  
52 See Beebe, supra note 18, at 338-39. 
53 Id. at 371-78. 
54 Id. at 386-95.  
55 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 248. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 98 F. 608, 610 (C.C.D. Ky. 1899). 
59 Id. In so finding, the court rejected Bleistein’s argument that the Copyright Act’s reference to pictorial 
illustrations and to fine arts were separate and distinct. In other words, were they pictorial illustrations? 
Even this was a source of debate because the posters included photographs and illustrations could be 
limited illustrations within a book. Id. 
60 Id. at 611. 
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latter, the court considered the pictures to be “merely frivolous, and to some extent 
immoral.”61  
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed that the prints had no connection with 
the fine arts.62 It then went one step further concluding that it would be inconsistent 
with the Constitution to protect a work with “no value aside from [the] function” 
of advertising.63 In its view, Congress only has the power to extend copyright to 
illustrations when those illustrations are connected to the fine arts.64 While an 
illustration that represented a “work of the imagination” might qualify even if used 
as an advertisement, the pictures in question were the pictorial equivalent of labels 
and were incapable of being protected by Congress.65 
The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the role of fine arts is noteworthy 
for three reasons. First, it raised the stakes of the decision by deliberately elevating 
the issue from statutory interpretation to constitutional interpretation. As 
demonstrated by the district court’s opinion, the case could have been resolved by 
statutory interpretation alone. Nonetheless, the court felt the need to address the 
constitutional question, and in so doing, converted a statutory requirement into an 
implied constitutional prerequisite.  
Second, it highlighted an important debate over whether the Constitution 
empowers Congress to protect the fine arts. While the district court found it 
unnecessary to address the constitutional question, it likewise offered an opinion 
on the scope of Congress’ power under Article I, Sec. 8.66 However, unlike the 
Court of Appeals, which concluded that the Constitution required a work to be one 
of fine art, the district court doubted that works of fine art were proper subjects of 
copyright at all; according to the district court, 
 
Inasmuch as the constitutional provision[s] . . . only authorizes 
congress to promote the “useful arts,” the curious might moot 
the question of the power to promote any but the useful arts, 
and consequently the lack of power to legislate to give 
exclusive privileges respecting the fine arts, unless in cases 
where they are also useful arts . . . .67 
 
While the court recognized that it may be both difficult and undesirable to 
distinguish between the useful arts and the fine arts, such a distinction was 
possible.68 And, works of fine art and works of imagination are not useful. To 
borrow from the court of appeals, they had no intrinsic value of their own under 
the Constitution.69 As such, the district court questioned whether Congress had the 
power to protect either the frivolous or the fine arts. The interpretation is consistent 
with what Barton Beebe describes as the early American view that the fine arts 
“were at best useless and at worst corrupting.”70 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit 
opinion was consistent with the turn-of-the-century view that the Constitution’s 
                                                        
61 Id. 
62 Courier Lithographing Co. v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 104 F. 993, 996 (6th Cir. 1900). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 996 (quoting Yuengling v. Schile, 12 F. 97, 100 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882)). 
66 Bleistein, 98 F. at 609-12.  
67 Id. at 611. In a dissenting opinion in Bleistein, Justice Harlan literally copies the Sixth Circuit 
opinion and adopts it as his own. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic, 188 U.S. 239, 252-53 (1903) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
68 Bleistein, 98 F. at 611. 
69 Courier Lithographing, 104 F. at 996. 
70 Beebe, supra note 18, at 339.  
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reference to progress “empower[ed] courts to apply a strict definition of fine arts. 
The thinking was that only aesthetic works that could satisfy this strict definition 
would ‘promote the Progress.’”71 
Third, neither court questioned its authority or competency to evaluate 
whether works were frivolous or of fine art. To the contrary, both courts were so 
confident that the illustrations in Bleistein were not fine art, they found in favor of 
the defendant as a matter of law.72 Under these circumstances, the question was 
not whether the illustrations were good or bad examples of art, but whether the 
illustrations could be categorized as fine art.  
By the time it reached the Supreme Court, the case raised two 
fundamental questions for this analysis. First and foremost, is the power to 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts limited only to those works, or 
does it include the fine arts? Or, as Beebe describes, does the Constitution grant 
Congress the power to promote aesthetic progress?73 Second, if Congress has the 
power to protect works of fine art, were the lower courts correct in their unanimous 
agreement that the illustrations in Bleistein were not examples of fine art? Justice 
Holmes answered both question with a resounding “no.” Unfortunately, much like 
Justice Stevens’ answer to, “Who cares about Honey Boo Boo?” Justice Holmes’ 
answer is much too brief and cursory given the weight and future implications of 
the decision. As Beebe argues, “Holmes’s brief, breezy opinion mask[s] the 
extraordinary tensions at work in the case and the fateful nature of Holmes’s 
resolution of them.”74  
Justice Holmes’s opinion flat-out rejects the argument that the fine arts 
were not appropriate for protection under the Copyright Clause, and it does so in 
a single conclusory sentence: “The Constitution does not limit the useful to that 
which satisfies immediate bodily needs.”75 His sole authority for this conclusion 
is the Court’s earlier decision in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, which 
held that photographs fell within the constitutional definition of writings.76 While 
Burrow-Giles held that a photograph of Oscar Wilde could be protected by 
copyright, it did so by concluding that photographs were sufficiently analogous to 
writings protected by the first Congress.77 As such, the decision did not consider 
the meaning of progress or the useful arts. Moreover, Justice Miller’s opinion 
relied upon the original intent of the framers of the Constitution to reach that 
conclusion,78 and it is doubtful that the framers intended to include the fine arts. 
As Beebe demonstrates, the framers appeared to have deliberately excluded the 
fine arts.79 So, to the extent that Burrow-Giles supported Holmes, it did so only 
                                                        
71 Id. at 357 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); see also Snow, supra note 18, at 6-9 (outlining earlier 
interpretations of the Copyright Clause as excluding works that did not fall within the definition of 
science).  
72 Courier, 104 F. at 997; Bleistein, 98 F. at 613.  
73 Beebe, supra note 18, at 327-28. 
74 Id. at 349. 
75 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903). 
76 111 U.S. 53, 59. 
77 Id. at 57. 
78 Id. stating: 
The construction placed upon the constitution by the first act of 
1790 and the act of 1802, by the men who were contemporary with 
its formation, many of whom were members of the convention 
which framed it, is of itself entitled to very great weight, and when 
it is remembered that the rights thus established have not been 
disputed during a period of nearly a century, it is almost 
conclusive. 
79 See Beebe, supra note 18, at 337-42. See also Snow, supra note 18, at 8-9 (discussing the Framers’ 
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through a logical syllogism. A photograph of Oscar Wilde does not “satisf[y] 
immediate bodily needs.”80 A photograph can be copyrighted. Therefore, works 
that do not satisfy immediate bodily needs can be copyrighted. Despite the dubious 
support provided by Burrow-Giles and Holmes’ absolute failure to explain his 
conclusion, this Article embraces it nonetheless. To the extent that copyright and 
the Copyright Clause address the broader question of human understanding, that 
understanding should include works that satisfy intellectual and emotional needs. 
But what works satisfy those needs?  
Even if the fine arts are equivalent to the useful arts, what is the definition 
of fine art? Once again, Justice Holmes’ response is startling in both its simplicity 
and its implications. In response to the defendant’s argument that the pictures were 
just advertisement and not fine art, Holmes answered, “Certainly works are not the 
less connected with the fine arts because their pictorial quality attracts the crowd . 
. . . A picture is none the less a picture, and none the less a subject of copyright.”81 
In other words, as long as the work falls within the category of works protected by 
copyright, such as a book, photograph, sound recording, or audiovisual recording, 
the content of those works is irrelevant. If the useful arts include the fine arts, the 
fine arts include the frivolous. It is the medium, and not the message, that justifies 
copyright protection. After Bleistein, copyright is now undisputedly content 
neutral. 
In defense of the non-discrimination principle, the opinion provides a 
justification that is simultaneously populist and elitist. Justice Holmes argued that 
[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only 
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of 
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most 
obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius 
would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would 
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new 
language in which their author spoke . . . . At the other end, 
copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a 
public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the 
interest of any public, . . . —it would be bold to say that they 
have not an aesthetic and educational value,— and the taste of 
any public is not to be treated with contempt. 82 
In other words, copyright protects works that some might consider “highbrow” 
and “lowbrow.” This is justified in part because sometimes we will mistake 
treasure as trash, but also because one man’s trash is another man’s treasure. And 
judges are not immune from either myopia or bias. As such, Justice Holmes uses 
the subjectivity of art as both a descriptive and normative argument to reject the 
contention that the Constitution requires courts to define fine art. While fine art 
may not defy definition, attempting such a definition “is a dangerous undertaking 
for persons trained only in the law,”83 and impermissibly elitist. Thanks to 
                                                        
understanding of science). 
80 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249.  
81 Id. at 251. 
82 Id. at 251-52. This Article leaves out Justice Holmes’s reference to commercial value. While I agree 
with Beebe that the emphasis on commercial value has been misplaced, Justice Holmes’s opinion does 
not rely as heavily upon the idea of commercial value as some may suggest. See generally Beebe, supra 
note 18 (critiquing Holmes’s reference to commercial value and arguing against an interpretation of 
progress focusing upon commercial value). 
83 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251; see also Brian L. Frye, Aesthetic Nondiscrimination & Fair Use, 3 Belmont 
L. Rev. 29, 35 (2016) (“If judges were to consider the aesthetic value of a work in determining whether 
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Bleistein, copyright protects trash and treasure and everything in between, and 
copyright cannot judge either. 
In light of the preceding discussion, this result is breathtaking. Of course, 
the importance of establishing the principle of non-discrimination, as Bleistein is 
commonly understood, cannot be overstated. Likewise, any faults in Justice 
Holmes’ opinion may be excused as the decision has withstood the far more 
demanding test of time. Nonetheless, in this discussion, Justice Holmes’ opinion 
in Bleistein is also noteworthy because of why he articulated the principle. The 
non-discrimination principle was not derived from the text of the Constitution, 
which makes explicit reference to science and the useful arts. Nor was it attempting 
to conform to the original understanding of the Constitution. By extending 
copyright to both works of fine art and works of entertainment, Bleistein rejected 
both the early-American and turn-of-the-20th-century understanding of the 
Copyright Clause. Instead, the decision put an end to any argument that copyright 
must be limited only to science and the useful arts, and did so by convincing 
readers to ignore the text of the Constitution.  
A close analysis of both Sony and Bleistein reveals that the decisions 
stand for much more than what is commonly understood. They stand for the 
fundamental proposition that all expression is valuable, and reject the proposition 
that copyright allows judges to discriminate against works of low value. 
Expression has value to both speaker and audience alike. Moreover, as the 
preceding discussion demonstrates, there have always been those that have 
questioned the value of entertainment and its place in the copyright pantheon. 
Nonetheless, in both Sony and Bleistein, the Supreme Court concluded that 
science, history, art, literature, and, yes, entertainment are all equals. As the 
remainder of this Article demonstrates, copyright’s non-discrimination principle 
plays more than just an important role in copyright; it is also a crucial First 
Amendment safeguard against content discrimination. By protecting all 
expression, including what some may consider frivolous or trash, Bleistein 
anticipated the Supreme Court’s extension of First Amendment protection to foul 
and offensive speech. When Supreme Court famously upheld a defendant’s 
freedom to say, “Fuck the Draft,”84 it rejected the argument that Cohen could have 
conveyed his message in a more refined manner. Echoing Bleistein, the Supreme 
Court responded that “one man’s vulgarity may be another’s lyric.”85 By following 
the non-discrimination principle, Sony is consistent with both decisions, even if 
the majority opinion does so only implicitly. In essence, the Supreme Court’s 
response to “Who cares about Honey Boo Boo?” and “What’s the big deal? It’s 
just entertainment,” is “Who are we to judge?”  
 
III. “It’s Just Entertainment” 
 
As the rhetorical question, “What’s the big deal? It’s just entertainment,” implies, 
discrimination against entertainment remains alive and well. Under these 
circumstances, discrimination occurs when courts determine the scope of 
copyright protection for entertainment, and not whether those works should be the 
subject of copyright. In other words, while copyright protects “trash,” it denies 
new authors of “trash” the same freedom as others. Of course, this is a big deal for 
                                                        
it is protected by copyright, their own subjective preferences could prevent them from recognizing both 
the objective aesthetic value of the work and its subjective aesthetic value to others.”). 
84 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
85 Id. at 25. 
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these new authors and for the audiences that would enjoy those works. 
Nonetheless, through the two most important doctrines in copyright law, the 
idea/expression distinction and fair use, once again, courts have claimed the power 
to determine whether expression is trash or treasure. Both doctrines are crucial 
because they determine the boundaries of a copyright owner’s rights and when and 
how subsequent authors may express themselves without fear of copyright 
liability. The idea/expression distinction initially determines how far copyright 
protects a work beyond literal reproduction. The fair use doctrine then establishes 
internal limits to this protection when its literal applications would conflict with 
copyright’s underlying purpose of promoting creativity. Under these doctrines, 
courts have created a double standard: one for entertainment, and one for 
everything else. This double standard results in asymmetric copyright protection 
for works of entertainment that privileges existing copyright holders at the expense 
of new creative artists.  
Before discussing how these doctrines have been interpreted to 
discriminate against entertainment, consider the three following scenarios. 1) A 
researcher, whether she is an historian, scientist, or law professor, writes a book 
by copying (with attribution) a prior work’s topic, thesis, and organization in detail 
in an effort to explain and analyze the same problem. 2) A fan of a television show 
writes a trivia book based upon the characters and events of the show. 3) A self-
proclaimed appropriation artist uses exact reproductions of another artist’s work 
as the centerpiece of his own work. In each of these cases, the author is clearly 
copying from another. In each case, the copying is extensive. In each case, the 
author is not relying solely upon the prior work, but adds their own creativity to 
produce a new work. In examples one and two, the authors are not copying 
expression but ideas, and in the third example, the author is copying without 
reference to the ideas and expression of the original artist. In each of these cases, 
whether the author’s new work is considered infringing depends upon the 
application of idea/expression distinction and the doctrine of fair use, and as the 
following argues, the conclusion depends almost entirely upon whether the 
purpose of the new work is “just entertainment.” 
 
A. The Idea/Expression Distinction 
 
Based upon the principle that copyright protects an author’s writing, the 
idea/expression distinction limits copyright protection to an author’s expression 
and not the ideas conveyed by the expression.86 According to the Supreme Court 
in Baker v Selden, “[t]he very object of publishing a book on science or the useful 
arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. But 
this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without 
incurring the guilt of piracy of the book.”87 The distinction recognizes the 
importance of allowing others to copy and borrow from an existing work, and 
                                                        
86 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (“[T]here is a clear distinction between the book as such 
and the [subject matter] which it is intended to illustrate.”). In Baker, the Supreme Court was concerned 
that the plaintiff was attempting to use copyright to protect rights that should otherwise considered under 
patent law. Id. at 102-03. In addition to the idea/expression distinction, the merger doctrine and scenes 
a faire deny copyright protection when there are a very limited number of ways of expressing an idea. 
See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Where 
an idea and the expression ‘merge,’ or are ‘inseparable,’ the expression is not given copyright protection 
. . . . In addition, where an expression is, as a practical matter, indispensable, or at least standard, in the 
treatment of a given idea, the expression is protected only against verbatim, or virtually identical 
copying.”). 
87 Baker, 101 U.S. at 103. 
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protects the creative process by limiting what an author can protect in the first 
instance. Put differently, “[t]he ‘promotion of science and the useful arts’ requires 
this limit on the scope of an author's control. Were an author able to prevent 
subsequent authors from using concepts, ideas, or facts contained in his or her 
work, the creative process would wither.” 88 At its most basic level, this means that 
copyright protects authors from piracy—the verbatim reproduction of their literary 
form or physical form whether the literary form is text, musical annotation, images 
or sound, and no matter whether the physical form is a manuscript, sheet music, 
photograph, or digital recording.89  
It does not give authors the power to prevent others from drawing from 
and using the information, knowledge, and ideas contained in their work.90 J.K. 
Rowling can no more prevent others from writing about a school for witches and 
wizards than Albert Einstein can prevent others from using his theory that energy 
is equal to the mass of an object multiplied by the speech of light squared. 
However, copyright law prevents more than verbatim reproduction: a subsequent 
author may violate the right of reproduction by copying non-literal elements of the 
work or violate the derivative work right by creating a new work based upon and 
transforming, recasting, or adapting the original work.91 In other words, copyright 
currently protects some of degree of expression beyond the literal text. On its face, 
the idea/expression distinction is content neutral. In practice, however, courts rely 
upon two different definitions for “ideas” based upon their subjective 
understanding of the relative worth of the subject matter copied. 
Consider the first scenario, a researcher adopting the theory of another. 
In Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Hoehling published the book, Who 
Destroyed the Hindenburg?92 In that book, he postulated that the Hindenburg was 
sabotaged by a member of the crew, Eric Spehl, to please his girlfriend and 
“explod[e] the myth of Nazi invincibility.”93 Subsequently, another author, having 
consulted Hoehling’s book, not only wrote his own account of the disaster 
adopting Hoehling’s theory, but also sold the motion picture rights to Universal 
City Studios.94 In turn, Universal City Studios created a motion picture using the 
theory as part of its depiction of the disaster.95 At the outset, the court noted:  
 
[T]he protection afforded the copyright holder has never 
extended to history, be it documented fact or explanatory 
hypothesis. The rationale for this doctrine is that the cause of 
knowledge is best served when history is the common property 
of all, and each generation remains free to draw upon the 
discoveries and insights of the past. Accordingly, the scope of 
copyright in historical accounts is narrow indeed, embracing no 
more than the author's original expression of particular facts 
and theories already in the public domain. As the case before 
us illustrates, absent wholesale usurpation of another’s 
expression, claims of copyright infringement where works of 
                                                        
88 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
89 Id. at 581-82. 
90 Id. 
91 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
92 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). 
93 Id. at 975. 
94 Id. at 975-76. 
95 Id. at 976. 
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history are at issue are rarely successful.96 
 
Hoehling did not dispute the existence of the idea/expression distinction, but 
argued that because the actual events that led to the Hindenburg disaster were not 
known at the time (and remain unknown); his conclusion that Spehl sabotaged the 
airship was more like a story plot based upon his selection and interpretation of 
facts.97 Nevertheless, the court concluded  
 
the hypothesis that Eric Spehl destroyed the Hindenburg is 
based entirely on the interpretation of historical facts, including 
Spehl’s life, his girlfriend's anti-Nazi connections, the 
explosion's origin in Gas Cell 4, Spehl’s duty station, discovery 
of a dry-cell battery among the wreckage, and rumors about 
Spehl’s involvement dating from a 1938 Gestapo investigation. 
Such an historical interpretation, whether or not it originated 
with Mr. Hoehling, is not protected by his copyright and can be 
freely used by subsequent authors.98 
 
According to the court, this limited copyright protection was justified: “[t]o avoid 
a chilling effect on authors who contemplate tackling an historical issue or event, 
broad latitude must be granted to subsequent authors who make use of historical 
subject matter, including theories or plots.”99 In other words, because Hoehling’s 
opinions were of the right kind for society, they were the wrong kind for greater 
copyright protection. Instead, Hoehling was only entitled to prevent others from 
“verbatim reproduction” or bodily appropriating his expression.100 As the 
preceding illustrates, the idea/expression distinction can draw a very clear line 
between ideas and expression. However as illustrated by the following discussion 
of scenario two, the line between ideas and expression is far less generous to new 
authors when the topic is not history but entertainment.  
Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group illustrates 
how courts interpret the idea/expression distinction under the second scenario 
when a fan of a work of fiction creates a work of their own based upon non-literal 
elements of the original. 101 In Castle Rock, the defendants published the Seinfeld 
Aptitude Test (SAT).102 The SAT presented readers with trivia questions based 
upon episodes of the Seinfeld television series.103 These questions tested the 
reader’s knowledge of characters and events that took place in the various 
episodes.104 The defendants argued that the SAT did not infringe the television 
show because the SAT copied only facts about the show.105 In other words, the 
SAT did not copy the expression of Seinfeld such as video footage, images, or the 
script. Instead, the book tested the reader’s understanding and ability to recall the 
characters and events that took place in the show. In rejecting this argument, the 
                                                        
96 Id. at 974. 
97 Id. at 977-78. 
98 Id. at 978-79. 
99 Id. at 978. 
100 Id. at 980. If Hoehling’s account was written as fiction rather than history, Universal would arguably 
have infringed his copyright by using his plot without permission. 
101 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
102 Id. at 135. 
103 Id. 
104 Id.  
105 Castle Rock Entm’t. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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court argued that there are facts and there are facts.106 The court distinguished 
between the copying of “true facts” such as those in a telephone book or the 
“identity of the actors . . . , the number of days it took to shoot the episode . . . , 
the location of the Seinfeld set, etc.,”107 and “creative” facts.108 Under this 
reasoning, the idea/expression distinction did not protect the creator of the SAT 
because she did not test whether the reader knows the name of the actress that 
portrayed Elaine: 
 
Rather, the SAT tests whether the reader knows that the 
character Jerry places a Pez dispenser on Elaine's leg during a 
piano recital, that Kramer enjoys going to the airport because 
he's hypnotized by the baggage carousels, and that Jerry, 
opining on how to identify a virgin, said "It's not like spotting 
a toupee." Because these characters and events spring from the 
imagination of Seinfeld's authors, the SAT plainly copies 
copyrightable, creative expression.109  
 
As such, the court distinguished not only between expression and ideas but 
recognized different categories of facts and ideas as well. The events and 
characters from a work of fiction, while facts in the literal sense, are not treated as 
facts for the idea/expression distinction. Instead, they are considered expression. 
As explained in a different case, this distinction is justified based upon a 
cost-benefit analysis similar to that in Hoehling. According to the Second Circuit, 
there is a difference between “ideas that undertake to advance the understanding 
of phenomena or the solution of problems . . . and those . . . that do not undertake 
to explain phenomena or furnish solutions, but are infused with the author's taste 
or opinion.”110 Moreover, this difference justifies greater freedom to copy from the 
former. In other words, courts have determined that it is important that individuals 
be free to copy from works “directed to understanding,” but not from those 
representing an author’s “taste or opinion.” This double standard is justified 
because the latter “do not materially assist the understanding of future thinkers.”111 
As such, lower courts unabashedly apply separate standards based upon the 
content of the speech, and in doing so, judge the relative importance of those 
works.  
Initially, this approach is problematic because it is not clear how one 
determines whether a work attempts to understand phenomena or provide 
solutions to problems and, therefore, is more important for society to copy, as 
opposed to a work of taste and opinion. Such an evaluation is fraught with 
ambiguity and subjectivity. Is reality television a matter of taste or opinion or is it 
a way to understand the human condition and human behavior? Is the podcast 
Hidden Brain a means of understanding human decision-making or a series of 
stories to entertain someone during their drive to work? As discussed above, both 
Bleistein and Sony concluded that these are not distinctions that should be made 
                                                        
106 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 137-39. 
107 Id. at 139. 
108 See Jeanne Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 Emory L.J. 71, 100 (2010) 
(suggesting that protecting “creative” facts may be inconsistent with information theory). 
109 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 139. 
110 CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reps., Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 1994). See 
generally James Grimmelmann, Three Theories of Copyright in Ratings, 14 Vand. J. of Ent. & Tech. 
Law 851 (2012) (discussing CCC and other cases copyrighting ratings and valuations). 
111 CCC, 44 F.3d at 71. 
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by the law. 
The effort to differentiate between ideas that promote understanding and those 
representing taste and opinion is also problematic because of how it is 
implemented. As discussed earlier, the stated purpose of copyright law is to 
promote the progress of science or, in other words, to promote human 
understanding and education. Assuming that it is both possible and appropriate to 
determine what constitutes the work of “future thinkers,” when expression 
“materially assists” those thinkers, the courts rather perversely provide the works 
closest to the constitutional purpose with the least amount of protection. Assume 
we all agree that a paper seeking to understand the relationship between genetics 
and cancer promotes the progress of science. Because this is an important subject 
and an endeavor at the core of copyright’s purpose, we guarantee future thinkers 
freedom to pursue their expression at the expense of past thinkers. In contrast, if 
we assume that Honey Boo Boo is not an important subject and an endeavor 
furthest from the constitutional purpose for copyright protection, we restrict the 
freedom of future entertainers for benefit of the copyright owner of Here Comes 
Honey Boo Boo.  
If the idea/expression distinction restricts entertainment relative to other 
expression, one might expect fair use—the principal defense to copyright 
infringement—to provide more breathing room. Unfortunately, fair use also 
ignores the non-discrimination principle and imposes greater restrictions on 
speech when the author’s purpose is “just entertainment.”  
 
B. The Fair Use Doctrine 
 
 If the idea/expression distinction determines when copyright protects against 
verbatim copying and when it protects significantly more of an author’s 
expression, the fair use doctrine “permits and requires courts to avoid rigid 
application of the copyright statute, when . . . it would stifle the very creativity 
which that law is designed to foster.”112 In determining whether the copying of a 
protected work is fair, the Copyright Act lists four nonexclusive factors for 
consideration: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted 
work, the amount and substantiality of the portion taken, and the effect of the use 
on the potential market.113 More simply, fair use considers the why, what, how, 
and the economic consequences of copying. These factors originated with Justice 
Story’s opinion in Folsom v. Marsh,114 which is often described as the first fair use 
case in the United States.115 However, as scholars have emphasized, Justice Story 
used the factors to expand copyright protection at the time rather than as a means 
for limiting protection.116 As this section demonstrates, with regard to 
entertainment, courts are once again using these factors, not to avoid rigid 
application of copyright law, but instead to expand those protections at the expense 
of new authors. Because these factors are not weighted equally, the first is 
considered far more significant than the second, this section begins briefly with 
how expanded protection is clearly achieved with the less weighty second factor - 
the nature of the copyrighted work.  
 
                                                        
112 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
113 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
114 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
115 L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and its Legacy, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L. 431, 431 (1998). 
116 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright 
Permission Systems, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 16 (1997); Patterson, supra note 115, at 447.  
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1. The Nature of the Work 
 
The fair use doctrine requires courts to consider the nature of the work 
being copied. Because this inquiry focuses upon what is being copied, it tracks the 
idea/expression distinction. As such, due to the societal interest in the 
dissemination of information, copying from works of science or history is more 
likely to be fair.117 In contrast, the copying from works of entertainment is less 
likely to be fair because future authors are not the equivalent of future thinkers. 
Once again, Castle Rock is a useful example. In determining whether the creation 
of a trivia book based upon a television show was fair use, the fictional nature of 
the television show weighed heavily against fair use.118 This point is so well 
accepted that the defendants conceded “the scope of fair use is somewhat narrower 
with respect to fictional works, such as Seinfeld, than to factual works.”119 Much 
like the idea/expression cases, the Supreme Court has justified this disparate 
treatment based upon the bizarre conclusion that these works are not as important 
to society, but, nonetheless, are “closer to the core of intended copyright protection 
than others, with [the] consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish.”120  
Under these circumstances, one may argue that limiting copying favors 
creators of entertainment. After all, it provides such works with greater copyright 
protection, and allows creators of entertainment to liberally borrow from history 
and other works of science. For example, in Hoehling, not only were other 
historians able to base their works upon Hoehling’s, Universal City Studios was 
permitted to make a motion picture -- a work of entertainment -- based upon that 
same work.121 However, as this Article touched upon earlier, this benefits existing 
copyright proprietors of entertainment at the expense of future authors of 
entertainment. As the following demonstrates, this asymmetric treatment of 
entertainment results from the judgment that creating works of entertainment is 
insufficiently valuable. 
 
2. The Purpose and Character of the Use 
 
The more important and insidious way fair use discriminates against 
entertainment is through the first factor, which asks courts to consider “the purpose 
and character of the use.”122 This factor is considered one of the most important 
factors in fair use, and arguably, should be the most important factor, because it is 
the only factor that considers whether any given act of copying is the equivalent 
of mechanical reproduction or creative expression in its own right.123 The 
prevention of piracy is the core of copyright protection and preserving the freedom 
of new authors to express themselves is the core of fair use. By requiring courts to 
consider why the alleged infringer copied, the first factor determines when future 
                                                        
117 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“The public interest in 
the free flow of information is assured by the law’s refusal to recognize a valid copyright in facts.”). 
118 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1998). 
119 Id. at 143. 
120 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). 
121 Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 976-77 (2d Cir. 1980).  
122 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
123 The fourth factor is often considered an equally if not even more important factor because it considers 
the economic harm to authors, and as such, whether a copyright owner is entitled to control that market. 
Nevertheless, the first factors serve the corresponding goal of determining whether copying produced a 
copy or produced something different. And, as such, the normative question of whether the copyright 
owner should control the creation of those works overlaps with what it means to injure the copyright 
owner in the market for such works. 
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authors may copy.  
According to the Supreme Court, under the first factor, courts must 
determine whether the purpose of the new work is merely to substitute for the 
original, “or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”124 If an 
author uses the prior materials for a different purpose or adds something new, the 
copying is more likely to be fair.125 Judge Leval, who first articulated what has 
become known as the transformative use test, argued that courts should consider 
whether the copyrighted work was “used as raw material, transformed in the 
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” 
because such uses qualify as “the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine 
intends to protect.”126 While a plagiarist adds “creativity,” their purpose for 
copying and resulting expression is still intended as a market substitute for the 
original. In contrast, if a new author’s contribution results in a work with a 
sufficiently different purpose or is sufficiently “transformative,” the first factor 
will not only weigh in favor of fair use, at some point, the work may no longer be 
considered a copy at all.127  
On its face, the transformative use test suggests that if an author writes a 
new screenplay for a sequel to their favorite movie or book, or creates a new set 
of maps or an expansion for their favorite video game, the first factor should weigh 
in their favor. While the work is based upon another, it does not retell the original 
story. Instead, the original is used as raw material for a new story. As this section 
demonstrates, when a work is considered a work of entertainment, no amount of 
creativity will excuse copying.  
In practice, judges interpret the transformative use test to weigh against 
fair use when the author’s purpose is “just entertainment.” Initially, supporters of 
this approach may point to the Copyright Act’s codification of fair use, in which 
entertainment is not listed as an example. Rather, the non-exclusive list includes 
“criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.”128 In 
other words, the statute itself discriminates against entertainment. Like the 
Supreme Court in Bleistein, courts have rejected such a narrow interpretation, and 
rightly so. Instead, they have concluded that 
 
[t]he “ultimate test of fair use . . . is whether the copyright law’s 
goal of ‘promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ . . 
. would be better served by allowing the use than by preventing 
it.”129 
                                                        
124 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citations omitted). 
125 Id. 
126 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1111 (1990). 
127 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 143 n.9 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Indeed, if 
the secondary work sufficiently transforms the expression of the original work such that the two works 
cease to be substantially similar, then the secondary work is not a derivative work and, for that matter, 
does not infringe the copyright of the original work.”). Rebecca Tushnet cautions that too great an 
emphasis on transformative use ignores the importance of simply acts of copying and can undermine the 
First Amendment value associated with non-transformative copying. See generally Tushnet, supra note 
47. For other criticisms of the transformative use test, see Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 
91 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 559, 620 (2016) (arguing for abandoning transformative use and focusing on market 
harm instead); Frye, supra note 83, at 47 (arguing that courts should “only ask whether the two works 
are different”); Laura A. Heymann, Everything is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 
Colum. J.L. & Arts 445, 448-49 (2008) (arguing that transformative use is best determined from the 
perspective of the reader). 
128 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).  
129 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 141) 
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More specifically, fair use protects “the ability of authors, artists, and the rest of 
us to express [the works of others]—or ourselves by reference to the works of 
others.”130 As such, there is no clear or definitive doctrinal reason to discriminate 
against expression when the purpose of that expression is to entertain. Moreover, 
as demonstrated in Part II.B., this is specifically prohibited by Bleistein.  
Consider Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, the principal Supreme Court 
decision addressing whether one work of entertainment may fairly copy another 
as a means of parody.131 2 Live Crew wrote and recorded, “Pretty Woman,” a song 
that copied extensively from Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman.”132 2 Live Crew 
copied Orbison’s song so extensively, they originally sought and ultimately 
obtained a license from Acuff-Rose which owns the copyright to Orbison’s 
song.133 The court of appeals concluded that the parody was not fair use because it 
was for profit and because it took the heart of the original.134 In reaching the 
conclusion that 2 Live Crew’s song may be fair use, the Supreme Court first 
concluded that parodies are sufficiently transformative to satisfy the first fair use 
factor.135 According to the Court, parodies “provide social benefit, by shedding 
light on an earlier work, and in the process, creating a new one.”136 And, just as 
importantly, copying is necessary to provide this social benefit.137  
Under Campbell, the key is commentary, not creativity.138 If the new 
work does not comment upon what it copies, it is not likely to be considered 
transformative, no matter how much creativity is added. The inquiry is not whether 
a particular use is sufficiently creative to transform a work into something new. 
Rather, it is more accurate to describe the Supreme Court’s decision as concluding 
that copying for the purpose of parody is a means to a legitimate end.139 Copying 
for purposes of commenting on the original is legitimate, whereas copying “to get 
attention or to avoid the drudgery of working up something fresh” is not.140 To 
make this clear, the Supreme Court compared parody to satire, and questioned the 
legitimacy of copying for purposes of satire because “satire can stand on its own 
two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”141 Even though 
both involve creativity and humor, authors of satire must explain why their 
copying represents more than an effort “to get attention.”142 Following this line of 
reasoning, the Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction prohibiting the distribution of 
The Cat NOT in the Hat! A Parody in which the author mimicked Dr. Seuss’ style 
to tell the story of the OJ Simpson murder trial.143 The court concluded that there 
                                                        
(alteration in original). 
130 Id. at 705 (quoting Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
131 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
132 Id. at 572-73. 
133 Id. at 572. 
134 Id. at 573-74. 
135 Id. at 579. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 580 (“[T]he heart of any parodist's claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some 
elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that 
author's works.”). 
138 Id. at 580-81. 
139 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he would-be fair user of 
another’s work must have justification for the taking.”). 
140 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. This language is particularly ironic from writers who largely quote and 
paraphrase the works of others. 
141 Id. at 581. 
142 Id. at 580-81. 
143 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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was no new expression, meaning, or message because “[t]he stanzas have ‘no 
critical bearing on the substance or style of’ The Cat in the Hat.”144 As such, aside 
from specifically commenting upon the work in question, it is not clear what, if 
any, entertainment-related use would satisfy the first factor.145 
Consider Castle Rock once again. There was no question that Beth Golub 
authored the SAT, that she used Seinfeld as the raw material for her trivia questions 
and answers, and Castle Rock did not have a trivia book of its own.146 There was 
also no evidence that the SAT harmed the profitability or diminished the audience 
of the television series or any other existing Seinfeld works.147 Despite the fact that 
the SAT was a new work, the court considered Golub’s creative contributions to 
be “slight to non-existent.”148 The court reached this conclusion for two reasons. 
First, the court considered the writing involved to require only minimal creativity. 
To support this conclusion the court wrote,  
 
In the time it took to write this last sentence, for example, one 
could have easily created the following trivia question about 
the film trilogy Star Wars: “Luke Skywalker was aghast to 
learn that Darth Vader was Luke’s (a) father (b) father-in-law 
(c) best friend (d) Jerry Seinfeld,” and innumerable other such 
trivia questions about original creative works.149 
 
In other words, the court judged the creativity of Golub’s contributions, and found 
it wanting. As just discussed, this is an unfortunate byproduct of the transformative 
use test which can ask whether copying was a means “to get attention or to avoid 
. . . working up something fresh.”150 According to the court, trivia questions, 
requiring so little creativity, represent nothing more than a “repackag[ing]” of the 
Seinfeld television series.151  
Moreover, in addition to dismissing Golub’s creative contribution, the 
court considered her purpose illegitimate.152 According to the court, copying 
creative facts to create trivia questions for a trivia book does not satisfy the purpose 
prong for fair use.153 Testing trivia is not criticism, commentary, or parody, and 
the SAT could not be reasonably considered educational.154 Instead, the SAT was 
just entertainment.155 If Golub engaged in a scholarly analysis of Seinfeld, parodied 
the series, or used the show as part of an art exhibition on “nothingness,” her work 
may have been fair – not because it would then be sufficiently creative but because 
its purpose would not be entertainment.156 Under these circumstances, courts 
                                                        
144 Id. at 1401 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580). 
145 When read in tandem with the fourth fair use factor consideration of market harm, legitimate reasons 
for copying do not include those purposes that a copyright owner “would in general develop or license.” 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. Yet, according to the Court, “[T]he unlikelihood that creators of imaginative 
works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the 
very notion of a potential licensing market.” Id. 
146 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1998). 
147 Id. at 136. 
148 Id. at 142. 
149 Id. at 143 n.8. 
150 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. 
151 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 142. 
152 Id. at 143. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. (“The SAT’s plain purpose . . . is not to expose Seinfeld’s ‘nothingness,’ but to satiate Seinfeld 
fans’ passion for the ‘nothingness’ . . . .”).  
156 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 
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should not express any opinion with respect to the creative choices of the allegedly 
infringing authors, let alone diminish their creative efforts.  Under the first factors, 
courts are determining whether the author’s reasons for copying – to write a sequel, 
engage in satire, or write a trivia book – are sufficiently different than the reasons 
a copyright owner may have had for creating such a work in the first place. More 
precisely, they are concluding that the only legitimate reason for copying is for the 
creation of works that the copyright holder would never willingly create.  
Compare the result and reasoning in Castle Rock with two subsequent 
decisions from the same circuit. The first, Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. 
RDR Books, is closely analogous to Castle Rock as it involved extensive copying 
of “creative facts.” 157 In the second, Cariou v. Prince, the alleged infringer does 
more than copy creative facts; he uses exact copies of the original works with no 
pretense of commenting upon the originals. 158 Nevertheless, in both cases, the 
courts concluded that the copying was legitimate because the purposes were for 
more than just entertainment.159 
In Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. RDR Books, Steven Vander Ark, 
a fan of J.K Rowling’s Harry Potter series, created “The Harry Potter Lexicon.”160 
The district court described his reasons for creating the Lexicon as follows: “His 
purpose in establishing the website was to create an encyclopedia that collected 
and organized information from the Harry Potter books in one central source for 
fans to use for reference.”161 The Lexicon described, among other things, the 
spells, characters, creatures, places, and events from the series and served as an A-
Z, a reference for all of the creative facts from J.K. Rowling’s stories.162 Vander 
Ark’s work was so good that Rowling herself admitted to using it when creating 
later works in the series.163 
Knowing that Rowling was interested in publishing a Harry Potter 
encyclopedia of her own, Vander Ark initially hesitated to expand beyond the 
website.164 Ultimately, RDR Books convinced him to publish his own book based 
upon the website, and the copyright litigation ensued.165 Rowling and Warner 
Bros. argued that the Lexicon violated their rights of reproduction and derivative 
work rights.166 Because the Lexicon made extensive use of verbatim quotes from 
Rowling’s works, the court concluded that plaintiffs had established a prima facie 
case of infringement of the right of reproduction in those works.167 However, more 
importantly for this discussion, the court concluded that Rowling could not prevent 
him from using her work for his intended purpose.168 According to the court, the 
Lexicon was not a derivative work. The court reached this conclusion even though, 
like the SAT, the Lexicon was entirely based upon Rowling’s creative facts, which 
                                                        
2006); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 2006); cf. Warner 
Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (concluding that a guide 
to the Harry Potter universe was not a derivative work because the guide had a different purpose than 
the original). 
157 575 F. Supp.2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
158 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 704. 
159 Id. at 708; RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 539. 
160 RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 520. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 521. 
164 Id. at 522. 
165 Id. at 522-23. 
166 Id. at 538-39. 
167 Id. at 538. 
168 Id. at 538-39. 
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she described as “plundering all of the ‘plums in [her] cake,’”169 and despite having 
adopted Castle Rock’s protection of creative facts in its reproduction analysis.170  
Instead, the court considered the Lexicon to be so transformative it could 
no longer be considered a copy of Harry Potter and, as such, was not only a fair 
use, but did not fall into the category of works protected under the derivative work 
right.171 The court reached this result by concluding that the purpose of the Lexicon 
was not a purpose reserved to the copyright owner.172 According to the court, the 
derivative work right only prevents others from recasting, transforming, or 
adapting the original.173 In other words, it prevents others from retelling the 
original story in another medium.174 Vander Ark did not copy Rowling for the 
purpose of telling the stories in the Harry Potter series in another medium.175 
Instead, the purpose of the Lexicon was “to give the reader a ready understanding 
of individual elements in the elaborate world of Harry Potter,” and copyright 
owners cannot prohibit others from creating such works.176 Under this approach, a 
companion or reference guide providing fans with an understanding of a 
copyrighted work serves a sufficiently different and valuable purpose from the 
original that it is no longer a copy -- let alone that the copying was fair.177 This is 
true even though the work was not intended as a scholarly commentary or analysis 
of the series.178 Furthermore, the purpose behind this type of companion work is 
sufficiently distinct from a companion that tests the reader’s knowledge of the 
Harry Potter series through a series of questions and answers.179 In distinguishing 
the Lexicon from the SAT, the court noted that the purpose of the Lexicon was “not 
to entertain but to aid the reader.”180 
 Lastly, consider how one court addressed scenario three and the issue of 
fine art. In perhaps one of the most expansive fair use decisions to date, Cariou v. 
Prince suggests that creating a new work of fine art is a sufficiently legitimate 
purpose to justify even wholesale copying.181 Patrick Cariou is a photographer who 
published a series of photographs of Rastafarians.182 Richard Prince purchased 
copies of Cariou’s photographs and then incorporated them into a series of 
paintings and collages of his own.183 Prince’s work was then exhibited and 
reproduced as part of a catalogue of the exhibition.184 According to the court, 
“Prince is a well-known appropriation artist” whose works have been displayed in 
art museums around the world including the Guggenheim and the Whitney.185 
Using a definition provided by the Tate Gallery, the opinion defines appropriation 
art as “the more or less direct taking over into a work of art a real object or even 
an existing work of art.”186 According to Prince, “he ‘completely tr[ies] to change 
                                                        
169 Id. at 526. 
170 Id. at 534-38. 
171 Id. at 538 n.17. 
172 Id. at 538. 
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 539. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 542 (discussing the transformative nature of a reference source under fair use). 
178 Id. at 543 n.20. 
179 Id. at 542. 
180 Id. 
181 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707-08 (2d Cir. 2013). 
182 Id. at 698. 
183 Id. at 699-700. 
184 Id. at 699. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
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[another artist’s work] into something that’s completely different.’”187 In one 
work, Prince used a series of heads from Cariou’s photographs as part of a collage 
with images from other artists.188 In another work, the court noted that Prince did 
little more than “paint blue lozenges over the subject’s eyes and mouth, and paste 
a picture of a guitar over the subject’s body.”189 The district court rejected Prince’s 
fair use defense, and the Second Circuit reversed.190  
Following Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the district court interpreted fair use 
as limited to circumstances in which new authors “in some way comment on, relate 
to the historical context of, or critically refer back to the original,” and found 
Prince’s works did none of those things.191 In fact, Prince testified during 
deposition that he “do[es]n’t really have a message,” that he was not “trying to 
create anything with a new meaning or a new message,” and that he “do[es]n’t 
have any . . . interest in [Cariou’s] original intent.”192 
In reversing, the Second Circuit concluded “Prince’s work could be 
transformative even without commenting on Cariou’s work or on culture, and even 
without Prince’s stated intention to do so.”193 Instead, copying is fair use if one 
may reasonably perceive that the new work uses the copied work as part of “new 
expression, and employ[s] new aesthetics with creative and communicative results 
distinct” from the original.194 The court concluded that twenty-five of Prince’s 
works clearly satisfied this test and qualified as fair uses as a matter of law because 
those works had a “new and different” aesthetic.195  
 
Where Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed portraits and 
landscape photographs depict the natural beauty of 
Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, Prince’s crude and 
jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and provocative.196 
 
The five remaining works at issue were remanded for further consideration 
because the court could not conclude whether they represented a “new expression” 
by conveying a “new meaning, or message.”197  
If RDR and Cariou are applied to entertainment, authors of entertainment could 
create their own stories with the works of others so long as they do more than tell 
the same story or tell the same story in a different medium. The remainder of this 
article will refer to this standard as “virtual infringement” or “virtual 
appropriation.”198 A fan of Harry Potter would be free to write a story with 
Hermione Granger as the protagonist without fear of copyright liability or a need 
to justify her decision. In contrast, this approach would prohibit a computer 
programmer from recreating the motion picture Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's 
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188 Id. at 700. 
189 Id. at 700-01. 
190 Id. at 712. 
191 Id. at 704 (quoting Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
192 Id. at 707 (quoting Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349).  
193 Id. at 707. 
194 Id. at 708. 
195 Id. at 710-11.  
196 Id. at 706. 
197 Id. at 711 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).  
198 This test is similar to the concept of thin protection outlined in Hoehling and Feist, which prevents 
verbatim or wholesale copying. Virtual infringement—telling the same story or retelling the same story 
in a different medium—more accurately captures both the scope of the reproduction right which would 
prohibit plagiarism and the derivative work right. 
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Stone as computer animation using only ASCII code. While these results would 
be consistent with a logical and principled application of what the Second Circuit 
considers transformative use, courts are unlikely to apply this standard to 
entertainment. 
As the preceding discussion illustrates, judges have exhibited both an 
implicit and explicit bias against entertainment, and RDR and Cariou are no 
exception. Both decisions rely heavily upon Castle Rock, and consider their 
outcomes consistent with Castle Rock.199 Neither opinion suggests the need to 
distinguish Castle Rock’s holding that creative facts are protected by copyright. In 
fact, RDR agreed with this conclusion and applied it with respect to the right of 
reproduction.200 Likewise, neither decision questions Castle Rock’s conclusion 
that it is not a legitimate purpose to create a new work “to entertain Seinfeld 
viewers” or to “satiate Seinfeld fans’ passion for the ‘nothingness’” of Seinfeld.201 
The court in RDR even described the arguments that the SAT was transformative 
as “specious,”202 and that efforts to profit from the “entertainment value” of a work 
weigh against fair use.203 Instead, the Lexicon did more than entertain and “satiate” 
Harry Potter fans’ desire for more things Harry Potter.204 The Lexicon aided 
readers by providing them with “a ready understanding of the individual elements 
in the elaborate world of Harry Potter.”205 And, Cariou distinguished Castle Rock 
on the basis that Prince’s work was directed at a different audience than Cariou’s 
while the SAT was directed at the same audience as the television series.206 
Because both decisions reject the idea that creating a work of entertainment is a 
sufficient justification for copying, it is unlikely that other courts will apply the 
virtual appropriation standard beyond the circumstances of those cases. 
Moreover, Cariou may well be limited to “fine art.” For example, in 
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, the defendants printed a t-shirt mocking the mayor 
of Madison, Wisconsin for attempting to end to an annual block party that he, 
himself, once attended.207 The t-shirt design began with a picture of the mayor 
taken by Kienitz at the mayor’s inauguration.208 The picture appeared on the City’s 
website, and the defendants copied it from there.209 The image was then digitally 
modified, colored green, and surrounded by the phrase “Sorry for Partying” in 
multi-colored text.210 Arguably, under Cariou, the defendants’ use would be 
considered fair because the image was used as raw material for new expression 
with a different aesthetic and meaning. Rather than reproduce a dignified 
photograph of the mayor, the t-shirt used the image as an outline for a 
                                                        
199 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708; Warner Bros. Entm’t v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 542-43 
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monochromatic, digital cutout of a political figure and criticized this figure for 
hypocrisy. While the court concluded that the use did not infringe Kienitz’s 
copyright, it did so primarily because the defendants digitally removed so much 
of the original image that no copyrightable elements remained.211  
With respect to this discussion, Kienitz is noteworthy for two reasons. 
First, the opinion specifically declines to follow Cariou.212 Judge Easterbrook’s 
reason for doing so is a skepticism that transformative use, such as the 
appropriation art in Cariou, can be considered fair without “extinguishing” the 
derivative work right.213 “To say that a new use transforms the work is precisely 
to say that it is derivative . . . .”214 To be clear, Judge Parker’s opinion does provide 
an explanation. Using the SAT as his example, he states that transforming 
another’s work is not fair use, “where the infringer’s target audience and the nature 
of the infringing content is the same as the original.”215 To the extent that Kienitz 
declines to follow Cariou, it suggests that Judge Easterbrook considered Cariou’s 
conception of fair use too generous, and its definition of derivative works too 
narrow. This perspective becomes clearer later in the opinion when the court goes 
out of its way to criticize the defendants’ use the photograph.216 
Judge Easterbrook’s criticism of the defendants’ creative choices in 
Kienitz is the second reason the decision is relevant to this discussion. Despite 
having concluded that the defendant’s use of Kienitz’s photograph was a fair use, 
the court goes on to sympathize with Kienitz and argues that the defendants “did 
not need to use the copyrighted work.”217 According to the court, they were not 
commenting on Kienitz or his photo, and there were plenty of “non-copyrighted 
alternatives (including snapshots they could have taken themselves).”218 Under 
these circumstances, the copying was not fair, but “lazy.”219 In the Seventh 
Circuit’s view, the goal of fair use is not to provide breathing room for all 
creativity, but to “facilitate a class of uses that would not be possible if users 
always had to negotiate with copyright proprietors.”220 Copying to create a t-shirt, 
even to send a political message unrelated to the copyright image, does not fall 
into that class.221 If copyrightable elements of the image remained, the opinion 
strongly suggests that similar acts of “lazy appropriation” would not be considered 
fair use even if they might satisfy Cariou.222  
Despite the Supreme Court’s admonishment in Bleistein, copyright law 
appears to have come full circle, with judges once again determining what 
qualifies as art. Fair use depends upon whether an author copies for what judges 
consider to be acceptable purposes, and not upon whether the author has created 
something new and different from the original.223 Noticeably absent from the list 
                                                        
211 Id. at 759 (“Defendants removed so much of the original that, as with the Cheshire Cat, only the 
smile remains.”). 
212 Id. at 758. 
213 Id.  
214 Id. See also Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting the difficulties 
created by oversimplification of transformation and its relation to derivative works).  
215 Cariou, v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2d Cir. 2013). 
216 Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759. 






223 Unfortunately, even if an author has a legitimate justification for copying they must still justify what 
they copied: a parodist cannot “skim the cream and get away scot free.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994) (remanding “to permit evaluation of the amount taken, in light of the 
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of legitimate purposes are copying for inspiration, copying as homage, copying as 
a point of reference, or copying simply because it strikes the artist as 
appropriate.224 When authors incorporate another’s work into their own works, the 
copying is transformative in a literal sense as recognized by Cariou. And, copying 
for these reasons is not the equivalent of copying to create a substitute for the 
original. Instead, fair use only protects works with a distinctly different purpose 
than the original, and as Kienetz adds, one that would not otherwise be possible if 
the creator had to negotiate with the copyright owner. Entertaining is not one of 
these purposes.225  
In tandem with the idea/expression distinction, fair use dramatically 
restricts the freedom of authors whose works are considered “just entertainment.” 
A scholar may rely almost entirely upon another’s work for their topic, thesis, and 
organization, and quote extensively from the work in short quotes or block quotes. 
As long as the scholar’s work is not the equivalent of wholesale duplication, it is 
not infringing even if the scholar’s own creative contribution is slight and may 
substitute for the original. While the work may not be considered valuable, and it 
may even injure the scholar’s reputation, the scholar is generally assured that they 
will not be subject to copyright liability. In contrast, if a musician wishes to capture 
the feel of another artist, “quote” from a prior work by including a portion of the 
song, perhaps the riff, bass line, or hook, or sample a portion of the recording, the 
musician faces a serious risk of a judgment that her work infringes copyright. 
Similarly, a filmmaker who loves the look of a poster or even a pinball machine 
and wishes to include it in a film risks infringement.226 While these acts of copying 
may occasionally be dismissed as de minimis,227 under fair use, authors must 
justify their choices, and if the reason for copying is to entertain, courts will most 
likely consider those choices wrong and lazy. 
As the preceding discussion illustrates, copyright law discriminates 
against works of entertainment. The idea/expression distinction dramatically limits 
the raw materials available to authors of entertainment, and the fair use doctrine 
virtually eliminates all uses of that raw material. Courts have reached these results 
by concluding that copying under these circumstances is just “lazy,” a means “to 
get attention,” or “to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.” 
Recognizing this bias against entertainment provides greater clarity to the 
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine, and explains why courts have 
concluded that new authors cannot adopt prior authors’ characters,228 look and 
                                                        
song’s parodic purpose and characters, its transformative elements, and considerations of the potential 
for market substitution”). 
224 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2015) (“A secondary author is not 
necessarily at liberty to make wholesale takings of the original author’s expression merely because of 
how well the original author’s expression would convey the secondary author’s different message.”).  
225 If the concern is substitution, requiring authors to provide additional justifications is entirely 
gratuitous. While there is a genuine concern that copying for legitimate reasons may still result in 
substitution, that concern is addressed by the remaining fair use factors. And, those additional factors 
are still considered even when courts conclude that the purpose of copying is legitimate. Dismissing 
these artistic purposes is the equivalent of adding insult to injury. 
226 See Gottlieb Dev. LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(concluding that the inclusion of a pinball machine in the background of a scene in a motion picture was 
fair use). 
227 Id. at 632 (quoting Ringgold v. Black Entm’t T.V. Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997)) (“The legal 
maxim ‘de minimis non curat lex’ -- ‘the law does not concern itself with trifles’ -- applies in the 
copyright context.”). 
228 See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1978); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 
Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
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feel,229 sound,230 or style.231 Likewise, the conclusion that Michael Bolton is just 
an entertainer might explain why courts have concluded that a new author may be 
subject to copyright liability even when the author is not aware that he is 
copying.232 Copyright imposes these restrictions even when new authors are 
creative in their own right and when their works communicate a different 
message.233 With the exception of the fine arts, copying for the purposes of 
entertainment is only fair when the speaker not only copies to tell a different story, 
but, for a purpose that is altogether different from the original. Despite Justice 
Holmes’ admonishment, courts are once again sorting the useless from the useful 
and the frivolous from the fine. And entertainment is once again frivolous. 
However, this time, works of entertainment are not being denied protection. To 
the contrary. Existing works of entertainment are given the greatest amount of 
copyright protection to date. Instead, new authors are denied the freedom to tell 
their own stories if their only value is entertainment. 
 
IV. IS THERE A THERE THERE? 
 
While the non-discrimination principle suggests that courts should avoid 
becoming the “final judges of the worth” of expression, is there, nonetheless, a 
non-discriminatory reason for treating entertainment differently? In other words, 
is there a principled distinction between works that “undertake to advance the 
understanding of phenomena or the solution of problems,” and those “infused with 
the author's taste or opinion” that justifies affording different degrees of freedom 
and protection? Even if one begins with the premise that all creative works are 
equally valuable, and that works of opinion and entertainment contribute to our 
understanding of what it means to be human, it is still possible that the pursuit of 
science and entertainment are sufficiently different to justify different treatment. 
Even if an action movie about a disaster created by climate change has a greater 
impact upon public appreciation of climate change than a peer-reviewed article by 
climatologists, there are still differences between a fictional movie and a scholarly 
publication. This section explores the argument that inherent differences or 
instrumental reasons justify different liability standards for science and 
entertainment.234  
The strongest argument that can be made in defense of separate standards 
is that there are different risks associated with overprotecting different categories 
of works.235 Under these circumstances, copyright’s double standard would be 
justified based upon the nature of the works rather than a judgment that science 
(or fine art) is more important than entertainment. As Judge Boudin described, 
                                                        
229 See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970). 
230 See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 853 (9th Cir. 2004). 
231 See Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
232 See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Michael Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 486 (9th Cir. 2000). 
233 For example, if Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet were still protected by copyright, Arthur Laurents 
would have been advised to obtain the copyright owner’s permission before producing West Side Story 
or to change the story completely.  
234 For the remainder of this Article, “science” is used as the shorthand for all works that may be 
considered to advance understanding to provide solutions to problems. In light of Cariou, fine art is 
arguably included in that definition. However, attempting to distinguish between fine art and 
entertainment directly contradicts the non-discrimination principle. As such, this section does not 
attempt to differentiate art from entertainment and will at times use them interchangeably. One may find 
as much beauty in a figurine of Yoda as a statue of David. 
235 Note that the issue is already framed in biased terms by describing the problem as a danger of over-
protecting works or suppressing more expression than necessary rather than as a risk of under-protecting 
works.  
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Most of the law of copyright and the “tools” of analysis have 
developed in the context of literary works such as novels, plays, 
and films. In this milieu, the principal problem . . . is to 
stimulate creative expression without unduly limited access by 
others to the broader themes and concepts deployed by the 
author. The middle of the spectrum presents close cases; but a 
“mistake” in providing too much protection involves a small 
cost: subsequent authors treating the same themes must take a 
few more steps away from the original expression.236 
 
If courts err on the side of overprotecting science, subsequent research may be 
chilled. Narrowly interpreting legal restrictions upon future authors reduces this 
chilling effect -- a basic principle of First Amendment law. This allows any 
number of scholars or researchers to work on the same question or problem. It 
allows them to produce works that would otherwise be prohibited for 
entertainment because they are substantially similar to a prior work or could be 
considered a derivative work. Under these circumstances, copying advances the 
goals of copyright, or is at least tolerated as a necessary cost for advancing those 
goals. 
In contrast, this position suggests that if courts err on the side of 
overprotecting entertainment, works of opinion and taste, little is lost. Chilling the 
creation of similar works that are “just entertainment” is acceptable because they 
do not advance human understanding. Entertainers are not thinkers.237 If 
substantial copying is considered inevitable or even desirable when advancing 
science, the same is not true for entertainment. Moreover, requiring artists, as 
opposed to scholars, to alter their expression comes only at a “small cost.” Some 
have even argued that copyright restrictions upon new authors increase and 
promote creativity by forcing them to “take a few more steps away” and work 
around the original expression.238  
 
A. Intrinsic Differences? 
 
Aside from relying upon the judicial conclusion that science is more important 
than entertainment, one can argue that this distinction is justified because factual 
and scholarly works are distinctly different.239 Facts are facts, problems need 
solving, and phenomena need exploring. There is only one set of historical facts 
for a given incident or a given set of circumstances for a specific problem, and 
those facts, “do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one 
                                                        
236 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring). The 
specific facts of Lotus demonstrate another example of differential interpretation of the idea/expression 
distinction with respect to computer programs. Much like Baker v. Selden, courts have been reluctant to 
expand the right of reproduction beyond literal copying for fear of creating patent-like protection. While 
related to the importance of distinguishing between idea and expression, the essay does not address the 
effort to distinguish the functional from expression, which is arguably a separate and sui generis issue 
created by Congress’s decision to provide copyright protection to computer programs.  
237 See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reps., Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 1994).  
238 For an excellent debate on this topic, see Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1333 (2015) (arguing in favor of restraint leading to greater creativity); Rebecca Tushnet, Free 
to Be You and Me? Copyright and Constraint, 128 Harv. L. Rev. F. 125 (2015) (responding to Fishman); 
Dan L. Burk, The “Creating Around” Paradox: Responding to Joseph P. Fishman, Creating and 
Copyright, 128 Harv, L. Rev. 1333 (2015), 128 Harv. L. Rev. F. 118 (2015).  
239 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991). 
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between creation and discovery: The first person to find and report a particular fact 
has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence.”240 
As such, the range of expression is naturally rather than artificially 
limited. And, because we want answers (or the truth, even if we cannot handle it), 
copyright allows those interested in working on these problems and topics the 
freedom to borrow substantially from their predecessors. In the absence of 
duplicating a work in its entirety, new authors may copy not only the heart of a 
prior work, but also everything of value contributed by their predecessors. There 
is no privilege in being the first to provide a given interpretation, proposal, or 
solution. As the Supreme Court has stated,  
 
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor 
may be used by others without compensation. As Justice 
Brennan has correctly observed, however, this is not “some 
unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme.” It is, rather, “the 
essence of copyright,” . . . and a constitutional requirement.”241  
 
Under these circumstances, copying and not control is the “means by which 
copyright advances the progress of science and art.”242 
Consider the Hindenburg. There is only one set of events that led to the 
destruction of the Hindenburg. As such, there are a finite number of explanations 
and interpretations of those facts. For historians working on the Hindenburg 
disaster, there are only so many possible explanations for why the airship caught 
fire. Spehl was a crewmember. He had a lady friend who was a suspected 
communist, so it is quite plausible that he did it and did it for her. Under copyright 
law, Hoehling may have been the first to put those pieces together, but that does 
not allow him to preclude others from adopting his description of events as their 
own, even without attributing it to Hoehling.243 As the Supreme Court stated in 
Feist, allowing others to copy is one of the ways in which copyright advances 
human understanding.244 
In contrast, consider a visual artist, whether painter, photographer, or 
graphic artist. One could argue that visual artists work with a virtually unlimited 
number of creative facts. They have an unlimited number of subjects to choose 
from and a wide variety of options for composing and capturing those subjects, 
including whether to use paint, camera, or computers. Because of the virtually 
infinite variations, one could argue that copyright prohibits a photographer from 
photographing a similar subject with similar choices for capturing and composing 
the photograph.245 This is true even when there is no dispute that the photographer 
captured their own photograph or a painter painted their own painting rather than 
“slavishly” duplicating the original.246 Instead, the visual artist is told to work 
around the first artist’s work for no other reason than that the original artist put 
those elements together first.  
                                                        
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 349 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
242 Id. 
243 While attribution may be required as a matter of academic ethics or if recognized as a moral right, 
copyright does not require attribution. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 
23 (2003). 
244 Feist, 499 U.S. at 350. 
245 See Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 457-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
246 Id. 
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Metaphysics aside, there is a difference between answering problems and 
expressing one’s tastes. Facts are discovered and not created. But aside from 
stating a truism, this does not adequately explain the different tolerance thresholds 
for copying. We may want multiple authors to explore the same specific topic or 
phenomenon, but there is no inherent value in multiple authors producing the same 
work. What is the intrinsic value of having a subsequent historian, economist, or 
law professor repeat the exact same thesis, organization, and conclusion of 
another?  
It is at this point that the “facts are different” argument conflates 
conclusions with expression. It fails to distinguish between the results of the two 
creative endeavors and the means of producing those results. In other words, when 
answering problems or providing solutions, it is inevitable and even desirable for 
multiple authors to reach the same conclusion or result. Reporters researching an 
event should discover the same facts. Was Spehl the saboteur? Did Russians 
interfere in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, and if so, how? Applying the 
scientific method, scientists should, likewise, reach the same conclusions and their 
work should produce the same results. For example, vaccinations do not cause 
autism, and humans are significant contributors to climate change.  
In contrast, in entertainment, there are no separate conclusions to be 
reached. As an expression of taste and opinion, the conclusion of the creative 
process, the result, is the work itself. When entertainers reach the same creative 
conclusion, they have created the same expression. For example, two poets may 
well conclude that an aspect of love is best expressed with, “A rose by any other 
name would smell as sweet.” Two screenwriters may also decide that heroism and 
the struggle between good and evil is best expressed as a struggle between monks 
wielding mystical powers and laser swords. Because there are virtually an infinite 
number of ways to express the fanciful, independently creating the exact same 
work while possible, is not inevitable.247 
However, while works of science may reach the same conclusion, it is 
not inevitable nor desirable for subsequent authors to simply repeat what others 
have said before. Take research in the experimental sciences, for example, which 
arguably has the strongest case for “repetition.” If one researcher publishes an 
article arriving at a certain result, other researchers must be able to replicate that 
result, and they must do so by precisely following the prior work. While one might 
describe the work of these subsequent researchers as copying, they are 
fundamentally doing and contributing something new. By repeating experiments 
and then publishing their methods, results, and conclusions, subsequent authors 
are testing the validity of the original research. The resulting publications are not 
repeating the work of the original, they are original contributions of their own. 
Under these circumstances, the value is not repetition, but validation.248  
Likewise, it may be desirable for multiple historians to research and 
publish on the exact same event in history, like the Hindenburg disaster. Because 
the disaster is historical fact, multiple, if not all authors, examining the topic may 
                                                        
247 The infinite monkey theorem postulates that an infinite number of monkeys typing at keyboards for 
an infinite amount of time will reproduce the works of Shakespeare. 
248 The same can be said for journalism. While there is clearly a value in spreading news and information, 
there is even more value when subsequent reports corroborate the initial reporting. Because of a failure 
to appreciate this form of “copying,” there is currently what some have described as a “replication crisis” 
in science in which a significant number of findings are not or cannot be replicated. See Ed Yong, 
Psychology’s Replication Crisis is Running out of Excuses, The Atlantic (Nov. 19, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/11/psychologys-replication-crisis-real/576223/. This 
crisis is driven in part by publications favoring “new original” contributions over replication studies.  
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reach the same conclusion. Yet, this is not the same as repeating and duplicating 
the work of prior historians to express the same conclusions that the prior 
researchers reached. It is quite the opposite because the study of facts, like the 
study of chemistry, only advances when historians make independent 
contributions of their own. This contribution could be made by adopting a new 
approach or perspective, contributing new information or insight, or, like the 
experimental example, simply confirming the work of prior historians. These 
contributions do not need to be dramatic or paradigm-shifting. The advancement 
of knowledge is often incremental. Nevertheless, while history is factual and 
authors do not create those facts, simply repeating another’s expression does not 
advance our understanding of history.  
Similarly, there is no inherent reason why science cannot provide more 
creative and innovative solutions if authors were required to take a few more steps 
away and work around prior authors.249 Once again, there is no benefit to society 
when two, let alone two hundred law review articles address the same copyright 
problem in substantially the same manner to reach the same conclusion especially 
if this is achieved by copying from a single source. Under these circumstances, 
one could argue that society would be better served if copyright, in addition to 
social and professional norms, required subsequent authors to make more than 
incremental contributions, but rather to make a significant or substantial 
contribution to the field.  
Unless a subsequent researcher discovers some new fact, there appears 
to be little to no value in having multiple authors making the same claim that Spehl 
sabotaged the Hindenburg for his girlfriend. For example, why should subsequent 
historians write about the Spehl hypothesis? Is this the inevitable and natural result 
of history? Wouldn’t society be better off if new authors were required to come up 
with their own hypotheses, or to write something that no one else has written 
before? Even if a historian wants to write about the Hindenburg, there is a 
significant, if not limitless, number of topics and perspectives that they may adopt. 
What role did the Hindenburg play in Nazi propaganda? What role did the disaster 
play in the decline in lighter-than-air travel? Likewise, if historians after Hoehling 
want to write about Spehl as saboteur, they could at least be required to provide 
independent research confirming or disputing his account. As such, restricting 
copying could encourage historians to contribute more to the study of history. Is 
the cost to the historian appreciably different, let alone greater, than the cost to a 
songwriter? In other words, the same arguments made for the creative costs and 
benefits of restricting works of entertainment can be made with equal force for 
restricting works of science. So while there is a very real difference between fact 
and fiction, between evidence and opinion, there is no inherent reason copyright 
should treat those works differently. As the Supreme Court has recognized, facts 
themselves may not be original, but the way an author puts together and expresses 
those facts is original.250 
 
B. Instrumental Differences? 
 
If there is no intrinsic difference between the factual and the frivolous 
that justifies a double standard, is there an instrumental justification? More 
                                                        
249 This is a fundamental aspect of patent law. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market 
Structure and Economic Performance 624-26 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing designing around patent claims); 
Burk, supra note 238. 
250 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991). 
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specifically, without judging the relative merits of the two, are there instrumental 
reasons for tolerating copying when creating works of science but not when 
creating entertainment? As discussed above, the principal justification for 
prohibiting only virtual appropriation is preventing copyright liability from 
chilling creativity and expression. With respect to science, the law tolerates 
copying that results in little or no contribution, because more rigorous protection 
could discourage new contributions. If, as discussed above, authors in science 
could be forced to be more creative if subject to greater copyright liability, what 
are we afraid of chilling? As the following argues, limiting copyright protection 
for works of science protects: (1) copying as a fundamental part of the learning 
and creative process; (2) incremental contributions that may not be recognized or 
appreciated as such; and (3) works that may not say anything new, but may say it 
better.251 Limiting copyright protection to virtual infringement creates breathing 
space for all three. It recognizes what Marcel Proust once said, 
 
The only true voyage of discovery, the only fountain of Eternal 
Youth, would be not to visit strange lands but to possess other 
eyes, to behold the universe through the eyes of another, of a 
hundred others, to behold the hundred universes that each of 
them beholds, that each of them is.252 
 
The first potential justification for tolerating extensive copying is that 
copying is integral to the learning and creative process that enables subsequent 
authors to contribute new works of their own. For example, short of fraudulently 
passing off someone else’s work as one’s own, using someone else’s ideas and 
expression is fundamentally part of learning and developing one’s own expertise. 
By copying earlier ideas and earlier expression, new authors study both the form 
and substance of their chosen subjects. Copying makes it possible for students to 
build upon, and -- every teacher’s dream or nightmare -- effectively critique those 
that came before them. Limited copyright protection facilitates this process by 
allowing authors to draw freely from existing work, both privately and publicly, 
as building blocks for their own work.253 
Second, limited copyright protection may be justified because society, 
especially those trained in the law, may not appreciate or immediately recognize 
that something new is being contributed. Justice Holmes made this point about 
appreciation in Bleistein:  
 
At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to 
                                                        
251 See generally Fromer, supra note 108, at 84 (using information theory to explain the importance of 
examining copyright questions through the lens of information theory). Fromer suggests that: 
For one thing, encoding the knowledge copyright law seeks to encourage in 
redundant forms will help to transcend noisy expression and accomplish 
copyright law’s goals of creating, disseminating, and preserving this knowledge. 
For another, encouraging expression that is valued in and of itself to be used and 
reused in multiple contexts will help provide important multiple meanings for 
this expression to different audiences in varied contexts. 
Id.  
252 Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, Vol. 5 The Prisoner, ch. 2  (C.K. Moncrieff trans., 
1923) 
253 In general, there is a very strong case for copying verbatim when copying is used to access a 
copyrighted work. See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 
347, 349 (2005) (emphasizing the need to permit individuals to engage in creative play); Tushnet, supra 
note 47, at 546. 
SPRING 2018 FIRST AMENDMENT & COPYRIGHT VOL. 17:2 
197 
miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them 
repulsive until the public had learned the new language in 
which their author spoke…At the other end, copyright would 
be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated 
than the judge.254 
 
Likewise, the contribution might be so incremental that it would be difficult for 
those who are not experts or well-versed in the field to recognize. In both cases, 
neither judges nor juries should be in a position to evaluate the merits of a new 
work or its contribution. A greater tolerance for copying leaves room for the 
possibility that what may appear to be nothing new, is in fact, something new, and 
is accomplished by removing judges and juries from the decision-making process. 
Lawyers and laypeople have no expertise or standing to evaluate whether a 
historian’s research makes a contribution to the literature any more than they are 
in the position to diagnose whether a patient is suffering from a heart attack or 
heartburn. 
Lastly, limited copyright protection may be justified for works of science 
because even when subsequent authors do not say anything new, they may say it 
better. As long as works of science do not use the complete expression of or 
plagiarize prior works, they do not infringe copyright. One may quote substantially 
and repeatedly, adopt the same argument and organization, and otherwise write 
the same work as long as it is in the new author’s own words. This is the true 
meaning and promise of the idea/expression distinction and fair use. Consider that 
fair use originally arose from the doctrine of fair abridgement, in which the 
contribution made by the subsequent author was editing a prior work down to 
size.255  
Allowing future authors the opportunity to express existing works in 
their own way is not only a value to the author, but to society as well. A new 
author’s expression may be clearer, more persuasive, or simply more enjoyable. 
Likewise, a new author may be able to reach new audiences. A two-volume edition 
of George Washington’s correspondence may be both more affordable and 
approachable, and therefore, more valuable to some than the twelve-volume 
edition from which it copied.256 A New York Times article summarizing a scholarly 
book on economic policy may make what the author expressed in the book easier 
to understand and more relevant to a wider audience. As such, we may tolerate 
significant copying in science because the way in which one explains a problem 
or communicates a solution is a valuable contribution in its own right.257 Just how 
valuable that contribution may be is ultimately left to the scientific community and 
the marketplace, not courts.  
So do these instrumental explanations justify greater freedom to copy in 
science but not in entertainment? Once again, the answer should be no. Copying 
plays a fundamental role in the development of entertainer and scholar alike. 
Likewise, lawyers and laypeople do not have the expertise to discern whether an 
                                                        
254 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic, 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).  
255 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
256 Id. at 349. 
257 Cf. Fromer, supra note 108, at 102 (arguing that repetition of material and expression aids in public 
understanding because “different people or groups are likely to find different…expression most natural 
to understand and learn from”). In the context of freedom of speech, Judge Learned Hand argued that 
the First Amendment, “presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of multiple 
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.” United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
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entertainer is offering something valuable or new. Not only do they not have the 
expertise, but their own personal biases will inevitably play a role in the decision 
making. As discussed earlier, this was exactly the point made by Justice Holmes 
when he articulated the non-discrimination doctrine. Judges, juries, and lawmakers 
have no business determining what is and is not “art” or what is and is not good 
entertainment. 
In fact, the nature of entertainment may suggest that there should be 
greater tolerance for copying. With many forms of entertainment, the process of 
copying is inherently part of learning and developing one’s talents. In science, not 
much is gained by one researcher painstakingly copying word for word, let alone 
photocopying, another’s article.258 While they may reread articles or copy them for 
later reference, they do not rewrite other people’s articles to hone their skills. 
Artists do. A bass guitar player will play music written by others until his fingers 
bleed. Singers will imitate other singers in the hope of sounding just like them. 
Painters will paint the same water lilies again and again. Photographers will take 
countless photos, attempting to reproduce an iconic image with the same look and 
feel as the original. Under these circumstances, repetition is a fundamental means 
of developing one’s expressive skills.  
In entertainment, repetition can also be more creative and original.259 
Copying as imitation is a means of exhibiting one’s talent and setting oneself apart 
from other artists. Few bass players will ever play like Flea. Few singers will ever 
sing like Freddie Mercury. Few painters will ever paint like Monet. And, few 
photographers will capture images like Ansel Adams. Yet, those that can will be 
considered great entertainers and artists in their own right. So, even when an artist 
sets out with the specific goal of reproducing another’s work, being able to 
replicate the work can be a creative achievement, and represents a uniquely 
personal contribution.260 As a cellist, if I could play the Prelude to Bach’s Suite 
No. 1 in G Major exactly like Yo Yo Ma, it would be an artistic and creative 
achievement, and something of my own. In contrast, retyping Justice Holmes’ The 
Common Law word for word is not.  
Likewise, the idea that “someone may say it better” applies with equal 
force, if not more so, in entertainment. The clearest example is the cover song. 
Once a song is published, other artists do not need the permission of the copyright 
owner to record their own version. The cover artist is required to pay a statutory 
fee, but because copyright law does not provide the owner with an exclusive right, 
the owner cannot prevent the song from being covered.261 In principle, the 
songwriter and/or original recording artist may want exclusivity to allow them to 
bargain with subsequent artists or remain the sole version of the song. In such a 
world, if you want to record “All Along the Watchtower,” you will need Bob 
Dylan’s permission. In the absence of that permission, when individuals want to 
listen to “All Along the Watchtower,” they would only be able to listen to Bob 
Dylan’s recording unless Dylan chooses to allow others to record their own 
                                                        
258 Again, this is distinct from copying in order to gain access to a work.  
259 See Beebe, supra note 18, at 392 (noting that the act of transformation itself is meaningful even if a 
new work is not produced). See also Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace 
Assumptions, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 513, 539 (2009) (arguing that fair use should consider more than 
the creation of a writing and must take into account noncommercial motivations for creating). 
260 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic, 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (“The copy is the personal reaction 
of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity 
even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's 
alone”); Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y 1959) (recognizing copyright 
protection for another artist’s reproduction of Rodin’s Hand of God). 
261 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2016). 
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versions. However, because copyright does not currently give Bob Dylan the right 
to prevent others from covering his song, you can choose among versions sung by 
Jimi Hendrix, Eric Clapton, Lenny Kravitz, or a long list of other artists. These 
“copies” are the artists’ attempts to express Bob Dylan’s song in their own way, 
and, for some, their way may be preferable. In fact, there is a long history of songs 
becoming famous only after a subsequent artist covers the original.262 
While cover songs are a straightforward example, other areas of 
entertainment likewise benefit from the idea that “someone may say it better.” A 
writer may wish to write a sequel to a famous story263 or tell the story from the 
perspective of a different character.264 A cartoonist may want to adopt the style of 
another to illustrate different subject matter.265 A songwriter may want to capture 
the feel of earlier works266 or even sample portions of the work in their own way.267 
The list goes on and on, with authors copying other authors as part of their own 
works. This is true whether the artist doing the copying is a professional or a fan.268 
Yet, currently, all of these creative endeavors, even an act as simple as mounting 
a copyrighted work,269 are at risk of being prohibited by copyright law. 
Finally, judges and laypeople are no more qualified to judge 
entertainment than they are to judge science. As Justice Holmes argued in 
Bleistein, there will inevitably be works of entertainment that the public does not 
understand or is not in the position to appreciate, and there will also be works of 
entertainment that will be rejected based upon the decision maker’s personal 
opinion and taste.270 Yet, these subjective value judgments are fundamentally part 
of the question, “Did the alleged infringer take ‘too much’?” Consequently, there 
are no instrumental justifications for a double standard. 
 
C. The Chilling of Entertainment 
 
A case can also be made that the creation of works of entertainment is 
much more likely to be chilled by fear of copyright liability. The first and foremost 
factor is the asymmetric threat of litigation. Authors of entertainment have much 
more to fear from litigation because the entertainment industry is notoriously 
litigious.271 Copyright owners often have deep pockets to backup threats of 
                                                        
262 See Bob Leszczak, Who Did it First?: Great Pop Songs and Their Original Artists 22 (2014) (“Big 
Yellow Taxi” originally recorded by Neighborhood, rerecorded by Joni Mitchel, Amy Grant, Counting 
Crows, among others); Bob Leszczak, Who Did It First?: Great Rock and Roll Cover Songs and Their 
Original Artists 3, 22 (2014) (Bob Dylan and Jimmy Hendrix, “All Along the Watchtower;” Carl Perkins 
and Elvis Presley, “Blue Sude Shoes”); Bob Leszczak, Who Did it First?: Great Rhythm and Blues Cover 
Songs and Their Original Artists (2013). 
263 See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010); BBC, Sequel to Catcher in the Rye “Banned in 
U.S.”, BBC (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-12181223. 
264 See Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding the Wind Done Gone, 
a story telling Gone With the Wind from the perspective of a slave, to be fair use). 
265 See generally Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(concluding that a movie studio violated an Illustrator’s copyright by copying his style). 
266 See supra Part I (discussing “Blurred Lines”). 
267 Compare VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016), with Bridgeport Music, Inc. 
v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
268 See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction and a New Common Law, 17 Loy. 
L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 651 (1997); see also Eriq Gardner, CBS, Paramount Settle Lawsuit Over 'Star Trek' 
Fan Film, The Hollywood Reporter (Jan. 20, 2017, 11:43 AM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/cbs-paramount-settle-lawsuit-star-trek-fan-film-966433. 
269 See Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1997); Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque 
A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1988). 
270 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). 
271 The Recording Industry Association of American has a long history of using copyright litigation and 
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litigation. Some are extraordinarily protective of their copyright because they are 
not authors themselves but instead rely upon those copyrights as a source of 
income.272 Last, but not least, as the “Blurred Lines” verdict illustrates, there can 
be a great deal of money at stake. As such, the threat of litigation, the cost of 
defending a copyright infringement action, and the potential for a multimillion 
dollar verdict are significant deterrents to engaging in even lawful uses of works 
of entertainment. There is simply no corresponding threat in the sciences. While 
there are exceptions, the financial value of copyrights for scholarly publications is 
so small that universities have only recently begun to claim ownership of the works 
of their faculty.273  
The following three factors also suggest that science might enjoy more 
breathing room even when faced with the possibility of litigation. First, authors 
often explicitly explain how their work adds to the existing body of knowledge. 
Making one’s contribution clear is part of scholarly norms. As such, authors not 
only focus on how their works contribute something new, but more importantly, 
they explain this to the reader. This allows authors to frame their work and its 
relationship to the work of others. Consequently, to the extent that readers may 
debate the appropriateness of an author’s use of other’s works, the author has at 
least had the opportunity to set the terms of the debate. 
Second, in science, research is governed by agreed-upon and published 
standards and guidelines. As discussed above, the scientific method sets a 
universal standard for determining how to proceed with scientific experimentation 
and when copying is a contribution. Similarly, institutions and departments create 
and publish rules and guidelines for what constitutes acceptable research, and 
establish ethical codes of conduct. While plagiarism may not subject an author to 
copyright liability, it will certainly subject the author to the censure of peers and 
their institutions. In other words, in science, authors have a clearer understanding 
of when and what kind of copying is acceptable even without regard to copyright.  
Third, because of the “expertise” associated with science, there is a 
natural tendency for those not trained in the subject to consider their own 
competency to make substantive decisions involving science. After all, what does 
a constitutional law professor know about the Hindenburg or molecular chemistry? 
                                                        
threats of litigation to control all uses of their works. For an excellent summary of their legal campaign 
in response to file sharing, see Electronic Frontier Foundation, RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later 
(Sep. 30 2008), https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later. While the RIAA and large 
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preventing other from using Dr. King’s speeches without their authorization. See Foley Hoag, Martin 
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things-you-should-know/. 
272 While this includes families of the original authors like the Kings and the Gayes, it also includes what 
some have described as “copyright trolls,” a phrase borrowed from patent trolls describing patent owners 
that do not use those patents to create inventions, but instead as the basis for generating revenue through 
the threat of litigation. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Copyright Trolls, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation https://www.eff.org/issues/copyright-trolls (last visited May 28, 2018). 
273 See Ann Spinger, Intellectual Property Issues for Faculty, American Association of University 
Professors, https://www.aaup.org/issues/copyright-distance-education-intellectual-property/resources-
copyright-distance-education-and/intellectual-property-issues-faculty (last visited May 28, 2018). In 
contrast, universities routinely assert ownership over faculty patent rights. See Bd. of Teachers of the 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776, 785 (2011) (holding that 
patented inventions first vest with the inventor); see also Laura Lape, Ownership of Copyrightable 
Works of University Professors: The Interplay Between the Copyright Act and University Copyright 
Policies, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 223, 251- 252 (1992); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 590, 591-592 (1987). 
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When people are aware of their own limited knowledge and expertise, research 
suggests that they are more open to accepting new facts and opinions from those 
with more.274 As such, one would expect that expert opinions may play an 
important role when a jury is asked to judge the merits of copying in science. So, 
even in litigation, authors can anticipate that standards, guidelines, and codes of 
their profession will play a role. While following the guidelines of one’s profession 
may do nothing to guarantee how well that work will be received, it should provide 
a degree of confidence that at least the work will not be the focus of a lawsuit. 
In art, authors are exposed to much greater subjectivity, and, therefore, 
have more to fear. Initially, while it may be clear to the author what they 
contributed, it is not a practice to explicitly describe that contribution. In science, 
authors frame how their work is viewed in advance. In art, the only immediate 
evidence will be the work itself. To the extent that the audience perceives a 
similarity with another work, they develop an opinion about the copying without 
any context from the author. This subjective interpretation exposes authors to the 
risk that new contributions may be mistakenly considered plagiarism because of 
the viewer’s first impression.275 
More importantly, there are no written standards, published guidelines, 
or adopted codes in entertainment. There is no comparable professional or 
institutional consensus on how art is to be created, how it is to be judged, or even 
what constitutes art. Instead, whether copying in general -- or any given degree or 
instance of copying -- is acceptable depends upon social norms and the subjective 
determination of the artist whose work is copied.276 Accordingly, how much is too 
much will vary from artist to artist and from case to case. Some artists copy others 
in their own work. Some do not. Some artists encourage others to copy their work. 
Some do not. Some artists consider copying flattery. Others consider it theft. As 
such, the copyright owner, who may or may not be the original author, initially 
decides whether the subsequent author’s copying is acceptable to them. If the 
copyright owner does not like how their work is being used they may object, 
threaten litigation, and/or actually litigate. If the copyright owner chooses to 
litigate, the decision as to how much copying is too much is then made by a jury. 
Because the decisions of individual artists and juries are very difficult to predict, 
in the absence of virtual protection, the sword of copyright will always hang over 
the heads of creators of art. Unless one attempts to create something “entirely” 
new or avoids creating altogether, there are no rules of the road to determine ex 
ante whether an act of copying should be considered acceptable.  
Lastly, people are much less hesitant to express an opinion on 
entertainment. Unlike science, the general public regularly makes judgments about 
entertainment. We listen to music, watch videos, and read works of “taste and 
opinion,” and in each of these instances, we make decisions based upon our 
subjective evaluation of the work. Likewise, few of us engage in titration or 
multivariate regression analysis, but we regularly engage in artistic expression. We 
                                                        
274 See Steven Sloman & Philip Fernbach, The Knowledge Illusion 19-23 (2017) (discussing research 
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do so even when it is as simple as singing along to music in the car or posting 
comments on social media. And, while great art requires special talent, engaging 
in entertainment and making decisions about entertainment require no such 
expertise; in all of these examples, personal opinion alone is sufficient. If asked to 
provide this opinion, there is no reason for jury members to defer to members of 
the entertainment community when asked whether the author took “too much.” In 
fact, some may bristle at and automatically reject the opinion of “so-called 
experts.” In science, an author may find some solace and security in following the 
accepted methods of science and professional guidelines to avoid litigation, and in 
knowing that if there is litigation, those standards will be considered when 
determining liability. In contrast, in entertainment, an author has no map to guide 
them when creating their work or fall back upon when defending their work 
against claims of “too much” copying. Instead, authors face the very real 
possibility that the merit of their work will be judged based on the subjective 
opinions of the least tolerant copyright owner and the least tolerant jury. 
As the preceding demonstrates, when the relative values of science and 
entertainment are removed from the calculus, there are no inherent or instrumental 
reasons that justify discriminating between factual and fanciful works. 
Acknowledging that there are no objective reasons to support copyright’s double 
standard, however, does not mean that we must treat them equally. The following 
section outlines why the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression 
suggests copyright should only prohibit virtual appropriation and translation. 
 
V. ENTERTAINMENT IS EXPRESSION 
 
How should the law respond to copyright’s double standard? Congress 
and courts could and, as this Article argues, should protect all expression equally. 
Because copyright protects authors from virtual appropriation in science, works of 
entertainment should be subject to the same standard. All authors should be free 
to express themselves so long as they do not tell the same story or the same story 
in a different medium. Then, copyright would no longer dismiss entertainment and 
the corresponding freedom of authors to express themselves. This approach would 
promote creative expression for all works by prohibiting piracy while still 
providing the necessary breathing room for new expression. However, recognizing 
the hypocrisy of a double standard does not mean lawmakers will reject it. 
Congress and the courts could simply embrace copyright’s current discrimination 
against entertainment and reject the non-discrimination principle. For example, 
because current copyright protection favors existing copyright owners, Congress 
could decide to protect their economic interests rather than the creative freedom 
of future authors.277 Even so, this section argues that without a principled 
justification for imposing greater restrictions upon works of entertainment, as 
applied to those works, copyright violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of 
freedom of expression. And, continuing to apply a double standard necessarily 
creates a conflict between copyright and the First Amendment. 
 
A. Unreliable Internal Safeguards 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court has not subjected copyright law 
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to additional First Amendment scrutiny. Instead, in the two cases in which the 
Court directly addressed the question, it concluded that First Amendment scrutiny 
was unnecessary because fair use and the idea/expression distinction sufficiently 
safeguarded the First Amendment interests in those cases. Moreover, on its face, 
copyright complements the First Amendment by increasing the potential financial 
rewards available to authors and by making markets for copyrighted works more 
efficient. The unfair competition created by allowing subsequent merchants to sell 
unauthorized copies in direct competition with the original would significantly 
undermine the financial incentives to create and disseminate those works. Because 
of this speech-promoting function, Justice O’Connor wrote that “it should not be 
forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free 
expression.”278 Additionally, as discussed below, to the extent that copyright 
restricts expression, the internal limits of fair use and the idea/expression 
distinction generally, on their face, alleviate free speech concerns. 
Based upon these twin pillars, the Supreme Court upheld a copyright 
judgment against The Nation for publishing unauthorized excerpts from President 
Ford’s memoirs.279 At the time, the memoir was unpublished and Time Magazine 
had negotiated the exclusive right to publish significant quotations from the 
manuscript prior to its publication.280 As a result of The Nation’s actions, Time 
rescinded the agreement.281 In upholding the infringement judgment, the Supreme 
Court rejected The Nation’s argument that its publication of quotes from Ford’s 
memoirs -- especially the President’s explanation for pardoning President Nixon -
- was newsworthy, and, therefore, protected by the First Amendment.282 According 
to the Court, freedom of speech was adequately protected by the idea/expression 
distinction and fair use.283 
Similarly, in Eldred, the Supreme Court upheld the Copyright Term 
Extension Act, which extended the length of copyright protection by an additional 
twenty years to its current term of the life of the author plus seventy years.284 In 
that decision, the plaintiffs argued that the term extension violated both the power 
delegated to Congress to create exclusive rights for “limited times,” and violated 
the First Amendment’s requirements for content neutral regulations of speech.285 
With respect to free speech, the plaintiffs argued that term extension was not 
sufficiently tailored to advance an important government interest.286 While the 
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the First Amendment 
required heightened scrutiny under the circumstances for the reasons discussed 
before, it also rejected the Court of Appeals conclusion that copyrights are 
“categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.”287 Instead, 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion left open the possibility that First Amendment 
scrutiny may be justified, “but when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the 
traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is 
unnecessary.”288 In both decisions, the Supreme Court concluded that additional 
First Amendment scrutiny was unnecessary to protect freedom of expression 
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because any restrictions of free expression were adequately protected by fair use 
and the idea/expression distinction. 
The twin pillars the Supreme Court has relied upon are erected upon very 
shaky foundations.289 While the Framers of the Constitution enacted both the 
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment within several years of one another, 
copyright was significantly narrower than it is today. The original Copyright Act 
of 1790 prevented others from selling or otherwise distributing wholesale 
duplicates of the copyrighted work. Authors could not protect plots, characters, or 
style. New authors were free to translate a copyrighted work into another language, 
and as discussed earlier, free to abridge existing works. Likewise, copyright 
protection only lasted fourteen years with the option of renewing for another 
fourteen years, and required authors to follow various formalities, including 
registering, providing notice, and depositing copies of their works, before they 
were entitled to protection. Under these circumstances, copyright was not so much 
a restriction upon expression as it was a prohibition against an unfair business 
practice, and the default rule was no protection. Today, none of these limitations 
exist. So while it is accurate to say that the Framers recognized the importance of 
copyright, they would not recognize copyright as it exists today.290 Consequently, 
one cannot rely heavily upon the Framers’ understanding. 
Reliance upon fair use and the idea/expression distinction also rests on 
shaky ground. Addressing free speech concerns by relying upon copyright’s 
internal doctrines of fair use and the idea/expression distinction has been described 
as “definitional balancing.”291 Because these doctrines play such a fundamental 
role in mitigating unconstitutional restrictions upon expression, Harry Rosenfield 
argues that fair use should be explicitly considered a constitutional doctrine with 
its scope determined by the First Amendment.292 As demonstrated by the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Harper & Row and Eldred, judges have not adopted 
Rosenfield’s reasoning, but have continued to rely upon definitional balancing. 
However, “[b]y addressing free speech concerns internally within copyright, 
definitional balancing leaves free speech at the mercy of copyright doctrine. When 
judges limit the idea/expression distinction or fair use in favor of expanding 
copyright’s property interests, as they have done in recent years, they limit free 
speech.”293 This is a form of copyright Lochnerism that “transforms the 
constitutional relationship between copyright and the First Amendment from one 
in which the Constitution defines the limits of copyright to one in which copyright 
defines the limits of the Constitution.”294  
By relying upon definitional balancing alone, judges open the door to 
judicial interpretation of copyright and its relationship to the Constitution based 
upon their personal economic philosophy: 
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First, by rejecting the need for additional constitutional scrutiny 
when Congress expands copyright beyond the Framers’ 
copyright, definitional balancing ignores or manipulates the 
baseline for evaluating the relationship between copyright and 
free speech. Second, by ignoring the baseline problem, 
definitional balancing ultimately allows judges to embed their 
own disputed vision of property within constitutional law at the 
First Amendment’s expense.295  
 
In short, definitional balancing allows judges to intentionally or unintentionally 
redefine the relationship between freedom and property rights based upon personal 
biases without necessarily considering or even acknowledging First Amendment 
concerns. As a respected member of the Law and Economics school of thought, it 
should come as no surprise that in Kienitz, Judge Easterbrook relied upon 
economic principles to determine the scope of fair use, and did so without 
considering the implications for freedom of expression.296  
Consider the following decision as another example of the dangers of 
definitional balancing. In Mannion v. Coors Brewing Company, Coors used a 
black and white photograph of an African-American man, wearing a white shirt 
and jewelry, on advertising billboards.297 It was undisputed that the image was 
based upon a photograph taken by the plaintiff Jonathan Mannion and copied many 
of his artistic choices.298 Originally, Mannion gave permission to the advertising 
company to use his color photograph of Kevin Garnett shot against a cloudy sky 
in which Garnett is wearing white clothing, jewelry, and a black cap.299 This photo 
was used by the company as part of its initial proposal to Coors.300 It was also 
undisputed that the photograph used by Coors was not Mannion’s photograph.301 
It was taken by another photographer, with a different model, on a different day.302 
It was printed in black and white and captured from a different angle.303 In their 
defense, the defendants argued that the image used on the billboard was permitted 
under the idea/expression distinction.304 In other words, they only copied the ideas 
embodied in Mannion’s photograph, and not the actual expression represented by 
the photograph itself.  
In rejecting the defendants’ idea/expression argument, Judge Kaplan 
launched a full scale assault on the doctrine.305 He began by noting that the 
idea/expression distinction originated with literary works where, “it makes sense 
to speak of the idea conveyed by the literary work and to distinguish it from its 
expression.”306 In contrast, he argued, it is much more difficult to draw a line 
between ideas and expression in other contexts, and this is especially true for visual 
works.307 In fact, according to Judge Kaplan, “it is not clear that there is any real 
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296 See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758-60 (7th Cir. 2014). 
297 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
298 Id. at 447-48. 
299 Id.  
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distinction between the idea in a work of art and its expression.”308 A 
photographer’s original contribution in a photograph, the contribution that entitles 
it to copyright protection, can be described as its conception, and “the word 
‘conception’ is a cousin of ‘concept,’ and both are akin to ‘idea.’”309 Based upon 
this reasoning, Judge Kaplan concluded that the “idea/expression distinction in 
photography, and probably the other visual arts thus achieves nothing.”310 Because 
it “achieves nothing,” the only question is whether a jury may conclude that the 
photographs are substantially similar to one another.311 Taken to its logical 
conclusion, this means that one of the principal means of preventing copyright 
from chilling new expression, the idea/expression distinction, no longer plays any 
role with respect to photographs and, perhaps, all of the visual arts. 
Judge Kaplan reached this breathtaking conclusion by equating what a 
photographer must do to obtain copyright protection with what copyright will 
ultimately protect. When photography was first introduced, it was argued that 
photographs were not writings and, therefore, could not be protected by 
copyright.312 According to this argument, photographs did not “embody the 
intellectual conception of its author,” but were instead “mere mechanical 
reproduction[s].”313 In upholding Congress’ decision to protect photographs, the 
Supreme Court noted that the “ordinary” photograph may lack sufficient 
originality, but that the photograph in question did “embody the intellectual 
conception of its author.”314 Quoting from the lower court’s findings, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the photograph was sufficiently original because it embodied 
the photographer’s 
 
own original mental conception, to which he gave visible form 
by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting 
and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various 
accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to 
present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and 
shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression, and from 
such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made entirely 
by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit.315 
 
Initially, Judge Kaplan’s opinion in Mannion expands upon Burrow-Giles by 
providing a comprehensive description and classification of the creative decisions 
made by photographers. According to Kaplan, photographers make creative 
decisions when they determine how an image should be rendered, when it should 
be captured, and what should be captured.316 In other words, these are the ways in 
which photographers demonstrate the degree of creativity necessary to obtain 
copyright protection. In the absence of even a minimum degree of creativity, the 
image would not receive copyright protection. This means that photographs taken 
by a monkey cannot be protected by copyright because the monkey did not make 
decisions with regard to rendering, timing, and subject that would otherwise 
                                                        
308 Id. 
309 Id. at 458-59. 
310 Id. at 461. 
311 Id. 
312 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58-59 (1884). 
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314 Id. at 59-60. 
315 Id. at 54-55. 
316 Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 452-54. 
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“embody the intellectual conception” of an author.317  
As Judge Kaplan recognized, how to render an image, when to capture 
it, and what to capture are very much ideas, but as Hoehling illustrated, just 
because an idea is original does not mean it is protected. In Mannion, the analysis 
is considered necessary because of the difficulty identifying the photographic 
equivalent of the distinction between the book and the writing contained in the 
book.318 However, there is a rather simple and logical equivalent of the 
idea/expression distinction for photography, and the visual arts in general. In the 
visual arts, one can distinguish between the print (or the digital era -- the file), and 
the image contained in the print. Under these circumstances, because Coors copied 
neither the print nor the image, one could have concluded that the defendants only 
copied Mannion’s ideas.319 However, rather than accept the possibility that 
copyright may only protect photographs against virtual appropriation, Judge 
Kaplan obliterates the distinction between ideas and expression altogether.320 
More importantly, for this discussion, he does so without even pausing to consider 
the First Amendment implications of this decision. While a copyright idealist may 
consider this result desirable, it is by no means dictated by copyright law, and by 
reaching this result, the court eliminated one of copyright’s two internal First 
Amendment safeguards.  
While Mannion is a particularly dramatic example of the failure of 
definitional balancing, it is just one of many examples in which courts may lose 
the First Amendment forest for the copyright trees. With respect to fair use, the 
clearest example of the corrosive effect of copyright Lochnerism can be found in 
judicial interpretations of what the Supreme Court has described as “undoubtedly 
the single most important element of fair use,”321 “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyright work.”322 The Supreme Court 
originally described this factor as determining whether copying was used to 
“supersede the use of the original work, and substitute . . . for it, such a use will be 
deemed in law a piracy.”323 To make this determination, courts considered “the 
degree in which they use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the object, of the original works.”324 In other words, even if the 
subsequent author only copies a portion of a work, when the purpose of copying 
is to displace the original, and may in fact harm the sales of the original work, such 
copying is not a fair use. 
With rare exceptions, like Sony, courts generally embrace a much 
broader and arguably circular definition of relevant market harm. Relying upon 
the statutory language of “potential market,” courts currently do not limit their 
analysis to the original market for the work, but instead, consider whether the 
unauthorized use will harm the market for licensing such uses.325 In other words, 
                                                        
317 See Camila Domonoske, Monkey Can’t Own Copyright to His Selfie, Federal Judge Says, NPR 
(Jan. 7, 2016, 10:34 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/07/462245189/federal-
judge-says-monkey-cant-own-copyright-to-his-selfie. 
318 Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 458-61. 
319 Id. at 461-63. 
320 Judge Kaplan also did not need to reach this conclusion as one could argue that even if all of 
Mannion’s decisions were ideas, it was the combination of ideas that were entitled to protection. The 
question would then turn to whether the defendants sufficiently copied enough of these elements to 
justify going to a jury. 
321 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).  
322 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
323 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
324 Id. at 348 (emphasis added). 
325 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (considering whether the market 
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rather than limiting the rights of copyright owners to instances in which the 
unauthorized use would harm the existing value of the copyright by displacing the 
original, courts presume that unauthorized uses are unfair unless the use is not the 
kind that a copyright owner would normally consent to or license.326 In Harper & 
Row, this meant that the magazine’s publication of an important news story was 
not fair because it violated President Ford’s right to license the first coverage of 
his memoir.327 In Castle Rock, this meant that the copyright owner had the 
exclusive right to control Seinfeld trivia books even if the SAT increased demand 
for the television show.328 Put differently, Wendy Gordon argued that if copyright 
is a response to market failure, fair use should be interpreted as a response to 
market failure as well.329 Under these circumstances, if there is no reason to doubt 
that a functional market for licensing the use might develop, the use should not be 
considered fair.  
In contrast, a parody of the song “Oh Pretty Woman”330 and a critical 
rewriting of Gone with the Wind, written from the perspective of a slave,331 could 
be protected as fair uses because it is assumed that copyright owners would not 
license such works. (No one would license a negative review.) In general, this 
means that unless works of art either parody or otherwise critically comment on a 
copyrighted work, copyright owners not only have the right to engage in the use 
themselves, but the exclusive right to do so.332 For example, if the SAT was 
considered a fair use, the decision would not have denied the makers of Seinfeld 
the right or ability to publish their own trivia book or even to license the SAT; it 
would have only denied them a monopoly on all such trivia books and the power 
to prevent the publication of such works. As such, fair use has shrunk from a 
doctrine that protected even the abridgement of copyrighted works to one that 
protects future authors only when they copy in ways or in markets that the 
copyright owner would not otherwise exploit. Once again, limiting fair use to 
instances of market failure may be excellent policy. However, by adopting this 
policy and limiting the scope of fair use, courts reduce the ability of fair use to 
protect freedom of expression. As Justice Brennan argued in his dissenting opinion 
in Harper,  
 
[T]he Court pursues the laudable goal of protecting “the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas,” [but this] 
economic interest is achieved . . . through an exceedingly 
narrow definition of the scope of fair use. The progress of arts 
and sciences and the robust public debate essential to an 
enlightened citizenry are ill served by this constricted reading 
of the fair use doctrine.333 
                                                        
is one that the copyright owner “would develop or license others to develop”); Princeton Univ. Press v. 
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Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982). 
330 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92. 
331 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2001).  
332 Even with regard to criticism and parody, both Campbell and Suntrust Bank left open the possibility 
that such uses may not be fair. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1276-77.  
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While Professor Gordon has considered the implications this may have on speech 
and how to protect those interests,334 despite Justice Brennan’s concerns, the courts 
have not. In light of judicial limits placed upon the idea/expression distinction and 
fair use, the First Amendment does not determine the boundaries of copyright. 
Instead, copyright defines, and constantly redefines, the boundaries of free 
expression. 
Moreover, for the purposes of this discussion as demonstrated in Part IV, 
entertainment disproportionately suffers the consequences of this erosion, and 
both doctrines are the vehicles for the discrimination against creators of such 
works. One might even argue that artistic freedom is being sacrificed to create the 
illusion that definitional balancing protects freedom of expression if only for 
science. Whether this is consistent with the Constitution has yet to be tested. 
 
B. First Amendment Harms 
 
Because of the historic relationship between copyright and freedom of 
speech, to paraphrase Justice Ginsburg, it is fair to say that the First Amendment 
“bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to [sell] other people’s 
speeches.”335 However, if definitional balancing cannot be relied upon to protect 
freedom of expression, especially freedom of expression for works of 
entertainment, how should copyright be evaluated under the First Amendment? 
The answer to “What’s the big deal? It’s just entertainment,” may be that it is more 
than just entertainment, it is freedom of artistic expression. While a full discussion 
of the First Amendment’s protection for freedom of expression and how it should 
be applied to copyright is beyond the scope of the Article, four problems are 
readily identifiable. First, as it is currently applied, copyright restrictions are based 
upon the content of the speech, and as such violate the basic First Amendment 
prohibition against content regulation. Second, this content-based regulation and 
copyright’s encroachment upon freedom of expression is made possible by the 
vagueness of both the rights and defenses recognized by copyright. Third, 
expanding copyright protection beyond virtual appropriation may not satisfy 
intermediate scrutiny, let alone strict scrutiny, because, as applied, the purpose is 
to suppress expression. Fourth, even if we were to accept that there is a legitimate 
purpose unrelated to the suppression of expression, as applied, copyright’s 
exclusive rights are not sufficiently tailored to achieve such a purpose.  
In general, the First Amendment makes no distinction between works of 
science and works of entertainment. Both receive the same treatment and 
protection. The First Amendment protects works of entertainment ranging from 
novels to films to video games.336 With a few exceptions, such as obscene speech 
and commercial speech, the First Amendment prohibits government from 
regulating speech based upon its content.337 In other words, freedom of speech 
                                                        
dissenting). 
334 Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural 
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protects an individual's freedom to express themselves as they see fit whether by 
wearing a jacket saying “f**k the draft,”338 burning the American flag,339 
exhibiting a movie that portrays adultery,340 creating a violent video game,341 or 
filming individuals engaging in sexual intercourse.342 As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, “Under our Constitution, ‘esthetic and moral judgments about art and 
literature . . . are for the individual to make, not for government to decree.’”343 
One might be tempted to argue that Article I, Section 8 justifies content-
based discrimination because it refers specifically to science.344 However, as 
demonstrated in Part II, this interpretation was fundamentally rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Bleistein.345 Moreover, while the Constitution prefaces 
exclusive rights as promoting the progress of science, this does not justify granting 
stronger, therefore more restrictive rights to works of entertainment. As Justice 
O’Connor wrote in Harper, “It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of 
copyright to accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest importance to 
the public. Such a notion ignores the major premise of copyright, and injures 
author and public alike.”346 In other words, the Copyright Clause might justify 
content discrimination if Congress chose to provide greater protection to science 
or to only offer protection to works of science despite the Supreme Court decision 
in Bleistein. However, it does not justify greater exclusivity for entertainment. 
Again, as discussed in Part II, to the extent that there is textual and historical 
support for treating works of entertainment differently, it would be to deny 
Congress the authority to protect such works at all.347 Because courts provide 
greater protection to entertainment than science, these interpretations violate not 
only copyright’s principle of non-discrimination, but the First Amendment 
prohibition against content-based discrimination as well. 
In addition to regulating speech based upon content, copyright runs afoul 
of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the First Amendment to prohibit both civil and criminal liability when 
the regulation of speech is too vague for an average person to understand.348 In 
other words, even when speech may be constitutionally regulated, the law must be 
sufficiently clear for individuals to understand what is prohibited and what is 
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permitted. Once again, as it is currently interpreted, copyright fails this First 
Amendment requirement. Initially, what is entertainment? How does one define 
entertainment? Is it what the Second Circuit described as expression on matters of 
taste or opinion? Editorials are by definition the opinion of their authors, but they 
also seek to address problems. Charles Dickens’ A Christmas Carol is a fictional 
novel about Christmas ghosts, but it also represents Dickens’ understanding of 
human nature and proposes how we should treat one another. Is an objective, 
principled definition even possible, or is it closer to the Supreme Court’s effort to 
define obscenity which famously led Justice Stewart to remark, “I know it when I 
see it?”349 
Even if it is possible to define entertainment, when copyright is 
interpreted to protect more than virtual appropriation, its protections are inherently 
vague and subjective. With respect to the right of reproduction, what does it mean, 
in the words of Judge Jerome Frank, “whether defendant took from the plaintiff’s 
work so much of what is pleasing . . . that the defendant wrongfully appropriated 
something which belongs to the plaintiff.”?350 What is the total concept and feel of 
a work?351 What is the heart of a work?352 Is a work based upon another because 
the subsequent author begins with that work and admits that they “copied” it?353 
What does it mean to recast or transform the original?354 It could mean to tell the 
same story in a different medium,355 or it could mean using any recognizable 
element in an entirely new work.356 The vagueness of these rights is compounded 
by the vagueness of the idea/expression distinction and the fair use doctrine. 
Once copyright reaches beyond virtual appropriation, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to draw the line between expression and ideas. In arguably 
the most famous description of the distinction, Judge Learned Hand wrote,  
 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of 
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more 
and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no 
more than the most general statement of what the play is about, 
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point 
in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, 
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 
“ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his property is 
never extended.357  
 
According to Judge Learned Hand, in determining when expression ends and ideas 
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begin, “Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”358 
Judge Hand reiterated this challenge in a subsequent case in which he wrote,  
The test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague. . 
. . Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator 
has gone beyond copying the “idea,” and has borrowed its 
“expression.” Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.359 
 
Judge Hand’s observations continue to be accurate. As illustrated by the previous 
discussion of Mannion, untethered from the constraints of literal appropriation, the 
boundary between expression and idea still defies definition. 
Similarly, the fair use doctrine provides little guidance for a subsequent 
author to determine whether their intended use violates copyright law. Initially, 
fair use is an affirmative defense, and as such, requires an author to pay for legal 
representation simply to evaluate let alone raise the defense. As such, the defense 
itself imposes a cost upon the speaker, and this cost will fall disproportionately 
upon new authors rather than established authors. Furthermore, a legal opinion on 
fair use will provide little guidance and comfort to authors interested in more than 
de minimis copying. If drawing lines between ideas and expressions is inevitably 
ad hoc, fair use determinations are expressly made on a case-by-case basis. Even 
parodies, which are perhaps the closest fair use comes to quintessential example, 
may be still be considered unfair if the author copies “too much.”360 It should come 
as no surprise, then, that on more than one occasion, courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have described the fair use doctrine as “the most troublesome in the whole 
of copyright law.”361  
So not only are the two principal protections for freedom of speech not 
doing their job, they are inherently vague and provide future authors with little-to-
no guidance on whether they have gone too far. And, arguably, the vagueness of 
these rules is what enables judges to dismiss the value of entertainment and 
obscured entertainment’s disparate treatment in the first place.362 If copyright is 
not limited to virtual appropriation, the only guaranteed way to avoid liability is 
for an author to obtain permission from the copyright owner which may or may 
not require them to pay for that permission, change their expression, or forgo 
expressing themselves altogether. Under any other circumstances, the fact that a 
speaker may face these choices would be unacceptable under the First 
Amendment.363 
With respect to these questions, the Supreme Court’s decision in New 
York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny364 may guide First Amendment analysis of 
copyright. Both copyright and reputation are considered property interests that 
may be protected consistently with the First Amendment. In general, liability in 
                                                        
358 Id. 
359 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
360 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994) (“This is not, of course, to say 
that anyone who calls himself a parodist can skim the cream and get away scot free. In parody, as in 
news reporting, see Harper & Row, context is everything, and the question of fairness asks what else the 
parodist did besides go to the heart of the original.”).  
361 See Sony Corp. of Am., v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984) (quoting Dellar v. 
Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 661 (2d Cir. 1939)). 
362 See Adler, supra note 127, at 574-75.  
363 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (requiring a clear definition for obscene speech).  
364 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) 
(refining actual malice standard); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 
(1985) (concluding that actual malice did not apply to private speech); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323 (1974) (concluding that the actual malice does not apply to private individuals). 
SPRING 2018 FIRST AMENDMENT & COPYRIGHT VOL. 17:2 
213 
both cases may be considered consistent with freedom of expression. For 
copyright, this is based upon the Copyright Clause, and for defamation this is 
based upon the conclusion that false statements of fact are not protected by the 
First Amendment.365 Both involve actions to vindicate individual rights, and as 
such are based upon an individual’s decision whether to seek redress for a 
perceived wrong. Some individuals are more tolerant about comments on their 
reputation, and some authors are more tolerant of unauthorized copying. 
Additionally, copyright and defamation liability are based upon judicially created 
standards that do not readily lend themselves to bright line rules. As discussed 
above, for copyright this includes, among others, determining whether the 
infringing work is substantially similar and whether it is a fair use. In defamation, 
this includes, among others, determining whether a statement is defamatory and 
what constitutes an injury to reputation. Finally, both are also subject to affirmative 
defenses. At common law, truth is an absolute defense to allegations of defamation 
much the same way that fair use is a defense to copyright infringement. 
With respect to defamation, in Sullivan, the Supreme Court concluded 
that the First Amendment requires that some injury to reputation must be 
tolerated.366 Initially, the Court made clear that defamation is limited to false 
statements of facts and cannot be imposed based upon a speaker’s opinions or 
ideas.367 With respect to false statements of fact, the Supreme Court requires public 
officials and public figures to prove constitutional malice: that the defamatory 
statement was made with the knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard 
for the truth.368 In cases in which private individuals are defamed as part of 
discussions of public issues, the Court prohibits states from imposing liability 
without fault, and requires constitutional malice for the imposition of heightened 
penalties like punitive damages.369 In the absence of imposing these new standards 
of liability, the Supreme Court concluded that speech would be unconstitutionally 
chilled by fear of damage awards.370 Under these circumstances, the affirmative 
defense of truth did not alleviate this concern, because speakers may still be 
deterred from speaking “even though it is believed to be true and even though it is 
in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the 
expense of having to do so.”371 Limiting the ability of individuals to successfully 
vindicate reputational harm was, therefore, necessary to create sufficient breathing 
room for an open and robust marketplace of ideas.372  
Sullivan and its progeny serve as useful markers for establishing the line 
between protecting the financial interests of copyright owners and the preservation 
of a vibrant marketplace of ideas. While the defamation analogy may not dictate 
whether copyright should be limited to virtual appropriation, it certainly suggests 
the importance of imposing clearer limits on liability even if clarity is only 
achieved by tolerating some injury to the copyright owner. While limiting 
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Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 771 (1985) (White, J. concurring) (“The necessary breathing room 
for speakers can be ensured by limitations on recoverable damages . . . .”); Richard Epstein, Was New 
York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 782 (1986); Pierre Leval, The No-Money, No Fault 
Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its Proper Place, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1287 (1988). 
VOL. 17:2 VIRGINIA SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL SPRING 2018 
214 
copyright liability to virtual appropriation is the clearest way to achieve this 
clarity, clarity could also be achieved by categorically exempting certain uses 
including education, news reporting, non-commercial uses, comments, criticism, 
and parody. Similarly, the defamation cases suggest that liability cannot be 
imposed without fault. At the very least, this suggests that copyright liability for 
subconscious copying is unconstitutional. Likewise, because fair use is an 
affirmative defense, it should no longer be relied upon to create the necessary 
breathing room for freedom of expression. Like the defense of truth, the possibility 
of a successful fair use defense is insufficient to dispel the chill of copyright 
liability. This does not mean that fair use no longer has a role in copyright, only 
that fair use no longer reconciles copyright restrictions upon expression and the 
First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression. 
 
C. Insufficient Government Interests 
 
First Amendment scrutiny will also require courts to evaluate the 
arguments put forward to support greater restrictions upon expression. Is a policy 
of expanding copyright to make investments in copyright more lucrative or to 
protect the economic interests of existing copyright holders a legitimate 
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression? Beyond virtual 
appropriation, copyright goes beyond the original purpose of preventing market 
failure and its complementary function of making markets for speech more 
efficient. While preventing virtual appropriation as a response to market failure is 
clearly a legitimate if not compelling governmental interest,373 at first glance, 
neither the goal of increasing economic incentives nor protecting existing 
economic interests, represent legitimate let alone compelling governmental 
interests.374  
For the sake of this discussion, let us assume that increasing copyright 
protection does in fact increase the incentives for authors to create and invest in 
new works.375 Under these circumstances, copyright would essentially be 
subsidizing copyright proprietors to increase their power in the marketplace of 
ideas. By granting exclusive rights to expression beyond virtual appropriation, 
copyright gives copyright proprietors the power to act as gatekeepers for a wide 
array of speech markets. This gatekeeping power allows them both to suppress 
competing expression within a given market and to use that control to generate 
wealth, thus increasing their relative ability to influence other markets for 
expression. There is no First Amendment precedent for such a goal.  
With few exceptions, the Supreme Court has concluded that it is not a 
legitimate government interest to regulate expression to improve the marketplace 
of ideas even if it is to allow speakers with fewer resources or access to media of 
mass communication to convey their messages as effectively as those with such 
                                                        
373 While the reproduction prong of virtual appropriation, preventing someone from telling the same 
story is consistent with copyright as originally conceived at the founding era, the additional protection 
of derivative works, the power to prevent others from retelling the story in a different medium, was not 
recognized at the time. 
374 Joseph Fishman argues that increased copyright restraint can lead to greater creativity, see Fishman, 
supra note 238. To the extent that the government’s interest in suppressing expression is a desire for 
greater variation of expression, it is at odds with the First Amendment. See Turner Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1994) (finding that ‘must carry’ rules were content neutral because 
they focused upon the means television programs were transmitted and not their content). 
375 There is virtually no empirical evidence to support this claim. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
254-55 (2003) (Breyer, J dissenting). See also Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Promote 
Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1669 (2009). 
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resources.376 In the few cases that the Court did consider that purpose legitimate, 
its conclusion was based upon the concentrated market power of the speaker that 
essentially allowed them to act as gatekeepers.377 The purpose of increasing 
copyright protection beyond virtual appropriation is the exact opposite of the First 
Amendment access and campaign finance cases.378 Increasing copyright protection 
beyond virtual appropriation gives copyright owners gatekeeping power and the 
ability to use that power to increase the relative wealth disparities in the market. 
There may be a certain appeal to this when that power is used by the artistic Davids 
of the world -- an unemployed J.K. Rowling, for example -- to prevent 
overreaching Goliaths from stealing their works. However, because copyright 
protection is biased in favor existing copyright owners, it is more likely that 
modern day Goliaths -- Walt Disney, for example -- will silence, or at least bully, 
the artistic Davids. If a purpose of reducing disparities in the marketplace of ideas 
and preventing certain speakers from acting as gatekeepers does not always satisfy 
intermediate scrutiny, the purpose of increasing those disparities and providing 
copyright owners with even greater gatekeeping power should most certainly not.  
Even more damning, under these circumstances, exclusive rights are 
clearly related to the suppression of expression. Increasing a copyright owner’s 
incentives is achieved by preventing others from using copyrighted works as part 
of their own expression. For example, even without the derivative work right, J.K. 
Rowling can create and license motion pictures based upon her books, and the 
reproduction right would prevent others from pirating her books and the motion 
pictures. The derivative work right, however, grants Rowling the additional power 
to suppress expression by prohibiting the creation and distribution of any other 
motion pictures based upon her writings. Likewise, she may suppress any other 
expression substantially similar to or based upon her works. The suppression of 
speech is the mechanism that allows Rowling to reap monopoly rewards. While 
some may believe that Rowling should be entitled to this privilege because it will 
provide her with greater incentives to write Harry Potter, it is unfair, or because 
borrowing from her is insufficiently creative, regardless of the justification, 
copyright’s purpose is clearly related to the suppression of expression. Once again, 
under First Amendment analysis, this is problematic, to put it mildly. 
Relatedly, to the extent that copyright responds to more than market 
failure but is a quid pro quo between the public and authors, there is no quid for 
the public quo. In addition to responding to market failure, copyright is also 
described as a quid pro quo in which the public is willing to provide authors with 
copyright protection in exchange for creating works, making them available to the 
public, and upon the expiration of copyright protection, for the work to become 
part of the public domain.379 Once again, prohibiting virtual appropriation has 
historically been understood to ensure this quid pro quo. However, there is no such 
guarantee beyond virtual appropriation. While greater protection may provide 
greater financial rewards for copyright owners, these rewards come with no 
obligation to create new works of their own. For example, the copyright owners 
of Seinfeld did not have to create a trivia book before they could prevent the 
creation and publication of the SAT, and they were under no obligation to do so.380 
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Copyright law allows J.D. Salinger to prohibit the writing and publication of a 
sequel to Catcher in the Rye even when he has no intention of writing a sequel of 
his own. Authors and copyright owners may wish to create substantially similar 
works, perform their works publicly, or create any number of derivative works, 
but they are under no obligation to do so. If they create those works, a limited 
reproduction right protects those works from piracy. To the extent that copyright 
owners license such opportunities to others, which is usually what occurs because 
novelists are not filmmakers, toymakers, or computer programmers, the licensee 
provides the quo. The copyright owner only provides permission.  
D. Inadequate Tailoring 
 
Finally, assuming that there are legitimate interests unrelated to the 
suppression of expression that justify extending protection beyond virtual 
appropriation, the First Amendment requires courts to consider whether the means 
chosen are sufficiently tailored to protect those interests while preserving freedom 
of speech. Courts will need to consider whether protecting copyright holders 
beyond prohibiting virtual appropriation burdens “substantially more speech than 
is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.”381 As the Supreme 
Court more recently stated,  
 
The purpose of the test is not to consider whether the 
challenged restriction has some effect in achieving Congress’ 
goal, regardless of the restriction it imposes. The purpose of the 
test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than 
necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to assure that 
legitimate speech is not chilled or punished.382 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision is especially noteworthy because a majority of the 
Court concluded that the availability of commercial Internet filtering software 
represented a less restrictive means of protecting children from unwanted exposure 
to online content.383 The Court reached this conclusion despite Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting argument that the majority essentially concluded that doing nothing was 
a less restrictive alternative.384 Because parents already had the option to use 
filtering software, he would have asked whether there were less restrictive steps 
the government could take in addition to the status quo.385 So, are the less 
restrictive alternatives to protect the interests of copyright owners beyond 
prohibiting virtual appropriation?386 
Depending upon the interest being asserted, there are a wide variety of 
alternatives to the recognition of exclusive rights in expression. Are alternative 
protections including the right of attribution -- to be accurately identified as the 
author -- or alternative means of compensation such as compulsory licensing 
                                                        
381 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 799 (1989). 
382 Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004). 
383 Id. at 667. 
384 Id. at 684 (“It is always less restrictive to do nothing than to do something.”) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  
385 Id. 
386 Then-Professor Breyer argued that a variety of legal tools and strategies could protect the interests of 
authors and publishers without resorting the exclusive rights under copyright law. See Stephen Breyer, 
The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 
84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970). 
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sufficient to protect the interests of copyright owners?387 Would a right of first 
refusal or a right of first adaptation for derivative works respond to the moral and 
fairness concerns when someone wants to retell the same story in a different 
medium? Does Congress go too far in burdening free expression when it relies 
upon exclusive rights instead? And, to what extent does the length of copyright 
protection impact all of these considerations? It may be that copyright protection 
was sufficiently tailored when authors were required to take affirmative steps to 
obtain and maintain copyright protection for an initial period of fourteen years. 
Under those circumstances, the default would be free expression, and when an 
author took the necessary steps to prevent others from using their work, new 
authors would be able to make use of them in their lifetimes. It is more difficult to 
conclude that copyright is narrowly tailored when it prevents three generations of 
authors from making all but de minimis uses of a work as part of their own creative 
expression.  
Consider the derivative work right once again. The derivative work right 
currently allows copyright owners to control any work based upon and 
incorporating the original.388 As a supplement to the reproduction right, it goes 
beyond the original need to prevent market failure. It allows copyright owners to 
prevent a filmmaker from making a motion picture based upon their novel; a 
painter from painting a scene from their motion picture, a sculptor from sculpting 
their character, and sequels and prequels in any means of expression, including 
those not yet invented. As the creator of Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope, 
under the derivative work right, George Lucas could not only create sequels to the 
original, license toys, costumes, novels, television programs, and video games, but 
could prevent anyone else from doing the same and even from creating anything 
new in the Star Wars universe. And, now, because Disney owns the copyright,389 
Disney may prevent even Lucas from creating new stories and works based upon 
his far, far away galaxy. While Lucas introduced audiences to the Star Wars 
universe, he did not create it, at least not in the biblical sense. While he told stories 
of Luke Skywalker and Darth Vader and about the struggle between Jedi and the 
Sith, he did not give form to every rock and stone, every creature, every individual 
in that universe, and he certainly did not tell all the stories that could be told. Yet, 
copyright prevents anyone from using their imagination and creativity to explore 
and give form to any part of that universe or to write new chapters in the struggle 
between the light and the dark. Given the breadth of this right, the derivative work 
right arguably represents the antithesis of narrow tailoring.390  
In this context, copyright and defamation share one last thing in 
common: both can be vindicated without resorting to monetary damages. This is 
important because in both cases, it is the fear of crippling financial judgments and 
the cost of defending against such claims that chills free expression.391 While 
                                                        
387 Compulsory licensing allows recording artists to cover other music and allows cable companies to 
retransmit television broadcasts, among others. It is also an alternative means of compensating copyright 
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Sullivan addressed this by clarifying and raising the liability standard for 
successful defamation lawsuits,392 and courts could do the same in copyright, this 
is not the only solution. In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Buildings, Justice 
White argued that the “necessary breathing room for speakers can be ensured by 
limitations on recoverable damages; it does not also require depriving public 
figures of any room to vindicate their reputations.”393 Limiting the remedies 
available to defamation plaintiffs by recognizing only nominal damages and/or a 
declaration of falsity, defamation law would still protect individual reputation and 
freedom of speech.394 This alternative deserves serious consideration as Sullivan 
has been criticized for both inadequately protecting individuals from defamation 
and, more importantly, failing to reduce the fear and cost of litigation in cases 
involving public figures.395 With respect to the latter, constitutional malice only 
shifts the focus of defamation suits from whether the speech was false and injured 
the plaintiff’s reputation to whether the plaintiff is a public figure.396 
To the extent that Sullivan did not sufficiently dispel the chill of 
defamation litigation and liability, Congress and the courts should reconsider 
copyright remedies in addition to liability. It is difficult to argue with the idea that 
Lucas deserves recognition, acknowledgement, even praise when others build 
upon his work as part of their own creative expression. But recognition, 
acknowledgement, and praise are not the same as control. Limiting copyright’s 
remedies to require attribution and/or disclaimers or to limit the monetary awards 
for infringement will certainly represent less restrictive and less chilling 
alternatives to copyright’s current remedies which include the potential for 
significant penalties in the form of monetary damages, statutory damages, punitive 
damages as well as criminal liability, injunctions, and the destruction of the 
infringing works.  
So, what’s the big deal? It’s a big deal because entertainment is speech. 
It’s a big deal to the entertainers who choose to express themselves with the works 
of others. It’s a big deal to audiences who want access to that speech. And, it’s a 




The First Amendment and the Copyright Clause can protect and promote 
freedom of expression. Nonetheless, they also exist in tension with one another. 
While the creation of exclusive rights to expression can promote freedom of 
speech, by its very nature, copyright suppresses expression. In other words, it is 
strong medicine, and like chemotherapy, creating exclusive rights in expression 
can cure what ails us, but can also destroy what is healthy. In its first incarnation, 
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the Licensing Act, exclusive rights to print became the vehicle for government 
censorship and the mechanism for monopoly control of the print industry.397 The 
Anglo-American tradition of protecting freedom of expression, including the 
adoption of the First Amendment, was a direct response to this threat to speech.398 
So too were the Statute of Anne and the Copyright Clause, which repurposed these 
exclusive rights for the public benefit.399  
Very early on, courts recognized that copyright can be a threat to itself. 
Aggressive interpretation and enforcement of copyright would threaten the very 
expression it was meant to promote. For well over a century, together with 
Congress, the judicial branch has attempted to resolve this conflict internally 
within copyright without reference to the First Amendment. The doctrine of fair 
use and the idea/expression doctrine became the principle pillars to uphold 
copyright’s value of expression. And while these can and do uphold the freedom 
of authors to create their own expression, as internal limits within copyright, it 
raises the very real possibility that judges will overlook the First Amendment 
forest for the copyright trees. The promise of creative freedom under copyright is 
not necessarily equivalent to the freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment. Fair 
use is not free speech. As this Article demonstrates, this problem is real. 
Moreover, as this Article argues, the Supreme Court created a third pillar 
to uphold First Amendment values as well. While courts have interpreted the 
Supreme Court decision in Bleistein as a warning to avoid evaluating the execution 
of a copyrighted work (i.e., is 2 Live Crew’s song a good song, or a good parody?), 
they have ignored or failed to appreciate the more fundamental significance of 
Bleistein. According to Justice Holmes, the Copyright Clause prohibits Congress 
and the Courts from discriminating against authors because the subject matter of 
their works may be considered unimportant or unworthy. To reiterate, the true 
meaning of the non-discrimination principle is a promise that copyright will treat 
all works of authorship equally. It will provide authors with the same degree of 
protection and the same degree of freedom. By adopting this principle, Justice 
Holmes not only articulated one of the bedrock principles of copyright law, he 
anticipated what would become one of the bedrock principles of First Amendment 
law as well: the prohibition against content-based discrimination.  
 Unfortunately, as this Article also demonstrates, not only have courts 
ignored or failed to recognize the full implications of Bleistein, they have 
undermined the two other pillars as well. By discriminating against works of 
entertainment, copyright infringes upon the freedom of expression of authors 
creating such works. Beginning with a simple, yet disconcerting question, this 
Article argues that copyright currently suppresses the creativity that it is supposed 
to promote and does so through a bizarre series of contradictions and hypocrisies 
allowing judges to restrict expression based upon their subjective interpretation of 
the value of that expression. The fact that courts engaged in this discrimination for 
so long neither excuses nor justifies this restriction. As Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes once wrote: 
 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so 
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting 
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long 
                                                        
397 See generally Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox 
(Rev. Ed. 2003) (discussing the history and origins of copyright law). 
398 Erwin Chemerisnky & Howard Gillman, Free Speech on Campus 30 (Yale 2017). 
399 Goldstein, supra note 397, at 40-43; Bettig, supra note 277, at 17-23; Patterson, supra note 115, at 
12-15. 
VOL. 17:2 VIRGINIA SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL SPRING 2018 
220 
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the 
past.400 
 
There may be reasons for restricting the freedom of speakers when their speech is 
primarily intended to entertain audiences. It may likewise be Constitutional to base 
this discrimination upon subjective evaluations of the value of those contributions 
or their relative worth compared works of science, social science or fine art. 
However, blind imitation neither justifies the practice nor supports its 
Constitutional legitimacy. 
While this Article has outlined copyright’s First Amendment problems 
and identified some possible solutions, it is only a beginning. And, while the 
problem is complicated and addressing it will be challenging, it is a problem that 
cannot be ignored. In the 18th Century when copyright was adopted, the expressive 
world was a world of scarcity.401 The economics of printing and subsequent means 
of distributing expression relied heavily upon the exclusive rights created by 
copyright. After all, neither authors nor audiences are served if they cannot reach 
one another. Copyright made that possible, even if it resulted in distributors 
gaining significant power and wealth because of their control over the means of 
distribution. This is no longer the world in which we currently live. The arrival of 
digital technology has created a world in which expression is no longer scarce by 
its very nature or due to the economics associated with its creation and 
distribution.402 Just the opposite. We live in a world of potentially limitless 
abundance. This is a world where everyone can become an author and reach 
audiences large and small who appreciate their creative expression. Some will 
create entirely new worlds while others will mix, remix, mashup, and otherwise 
use the works of others as raw material for their own expression. In the 21st 
century, the old economics no longer apply.403 And, while copyright may still play 
an important role in this world, it poses the very real danger of subtracting more 
expression than it adds. 
For artists, it is hard enough to hear one’s muse and find the confidence 
to tell one’s story without the noise of others telling you what you can and cannot 
do, that the story you wish to tell or the way you wish to tell it is not right, proper, 
or good enough. Copyright should not add fear to that self-doubt -- fear of serious 
legal consequence for violating rules that defy definition. We all deserve the right 
to prevent others from pirating our stories, and we all deserve the freedom to tell 
our stories as we see fit. For too long, copyright has balanced these two principles 
on the backs of authors of entertainment in a manner that simultaneously exalts 
and denigrates their works. It is time to end copyright’s double standard, and to 
begin protecting and promoting the rights and freedom of all authors. 
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